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THE SETTLEMENT PROBLEM IN PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW
Susan D. Carle*
Public interest lawyers, of many types and political persuasions, play a vital
role in pursuing '"public justice." For public interest (as for all) lawyers,
settlement provides an important means of resolving cases. Yet a persisting
ambivalence about case settlement in public interest law contributes to the
difficulties public interest practitioners face in sustaining themselves in practice.
Indeed, public interest lawyers identify case settlement as posing some of the
most vexing legal ethics problems they routinely confront.
The trouble often stems from the fact that, in public interest law where
clients do not pay for legal services, the economic incentives that encourage
paying clients to settle their cases do not apply. Clients ofpublic interest lawyers
do not have to pay for more legal services when they decide against settling, and
clients may direct their lawyers to continue litigating far beyond any rational
hope offavorable judgment. Yet public interest lawyers have limited time and
other resources, and must triage among many clients with worthy cases who need
their attention. What, in this situation, are public interest lawyers to do?
Cognizant of legal academics' responsibility to help practitioners olve real
world problems, this Article tackles this basic legal ethics conundrum in public
interest case settlement. It starts by exploring what legal ethics principles dictate
that public interest lawyers cannot do in case settlement, and then moves on to
propose several alternatives that can help public interest lawyers protect their
legitimate interests. The directions this Article proposes include: (1) using limited
scope representation agreements to curtail the duration and scope of lawyers'
representation obligations; (2) introducing fee-for-service arrangements after a
certain point in case representations; and (3) transferring case funding risks to
third-party payers, such as nonprofit organizations, to which legal ethics
strictures do not apply.
The underlying point of this Article is to spark creative yet practical
discussion, in an experimental problem-solving spirit, about specific ethics
problems that confront public interest practitioners. In so doing it joins a
collective scholarly effort aimed at assisting public interest lawyers to maintain
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their long-term ability to practice, in order to promote the interests of the most
vulnerable and marginalized persons in American society.
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More than thirty years ago, in a famous article entitled Against Settlement,
Professor Owen Fiss argued against settlement i  public interest cases.' Fiss's
provocation spawned an outpouring of responses over many ears. Many
commentators criticize Fiss's argument for a host of reasons.2 Today, no one
argues that public interest lawyers should not settle cases. Yet, an ongoing
preoccupation with Fiss's article arguably reflects a deep, continuing
ambivalence about case settlement in-public interest law.
1. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that
judges' duty "to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such
as the Constitution and statues" and "bring reality into accord with them . . . is not
discharged when the parties settle").
2. See, e.g., Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94
YALE L.J. 1660, 1663 (1985) (arguing that "Fiss's model of traditional dispute resolution is
flat; it is only an abstraction, and is therefore also a caricature. It has no relation to the world
as it is"). In 2009, a retrospective symposium on Fiss's article collected critiques from many
quarters. See Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement
Divide, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1117, 1119-21 (2009) (synthesizing leading commentators'
many critiques of Fiss's classic article, including that it fails to confront "hard, practical
realities"; that trials have "no monopoly on justice"; and that settlement can often achieve
"greater justice" than adjudication) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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The issues that confront public interest lawyers in settling cases are often
basic but thorny ones.3 For example, what should a lawyer do when a non-fee-
paying client decides against accepting a settlement offer the lawyer believes is
the best outcome the client is likely to obtain? Sometimes it may be the client
who wants to settle and the lawyer who wants to continue pursuing a case in
order to establish a certain point of law.4 Ethics precepts instruct lawyers to
follow the client's instructions in both of these situations. Yet, when public
interest lawyers are called upon to continue providing legal services to clients
with hopeless cases, these lawyers face financial detriment and may soon find
themselves out of business if they receive no compensation for their services.5
3. Other issues that plague public interest lawyers involve complex cases such as
class actions as well as the difficult demands of the aggregate settlement rule. Legal ethics
scholars have written many important articles addressing these legal ethics issues, while
more basic issues remain underexplored. For important articles addressing the aggregate
settlement rule in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2014), see, e.g., Howard M.
Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1769, 1784-95
(2005) (examining various types of aggregate settlements and the ethics issues they present);
Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort Plaintiffs' Representation: Beyond the
Aggregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 3233, 3257-66 (2013) (presenting expert
thoughts on solutions to the problems created by Model Rule 1.8(g)); Carol A. Needham,
Advance Consent o Aggregate Settlements: Reflections on Attorneys' Fiduciary Obligations
and Professional Responsibility Duties, 44 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 511, 513-30 (2012) (applying
fundamental ethics principles to think through what should be required in aggregate
settlements). Classic articles on ethics and class action settlements include Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1164-1219 (1995) (discussing ethics issues in class action
settlements); and Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv.
1183, 1186-1202 (1982) (addressing conflicts in institutional reform litigation).
4. Derrick Bell explored this scenario in his classic article that spurred the growth of
a public interest lawyering ethics literature. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J.
470, 472-513 (1976) (analyzing ethics issues presented when theparents of child plaintiffs in
school desegregation cases wanted to settle with school districts for improved resources, but
NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers wanted to litigate to push the principle of school
integration). In my experience in the contemporary context, the scenario of lawyers
recommending settlement but clients refusing is the more problematic one for public interest
lawyers, so it is the problem of the non-settling client I focus on here. I address the opposite
scenario of the lawyer who does not want to settle in Susan Carle & Scott Cummings, A
Reflection on the Ethics of Movement Lawyering, 30 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS
*(forthcoming 2018).
5. For data suggesting a causal link between court doctrines making it harder for
public interest lawyers to fund their practices and a decline in the number of practicing
public interest lawyers, see Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural
Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney
General, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1087, 1116-31 (2007) (finding that judicial attacks on attorney
fees have restricted what cases public interest lawyers bring); Wilber H. Boies & Latonia
Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement Residue and Cy Pres Awards: Emerging Problems and
Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & THE L. 268, 290 (2014) (explaining that states
approving cy pres awards to public interest lawyers are increasing access to justice for those
otherwise unable to afford representation); Jeffrey Kosbie, Donor Preferences and the Crisis
in Public Interest Law, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 43, 89-90 (2017) (showing a positive link
between the availability of donations and the number of public interest lawyers); Louise G.
2018] 3
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Settlement poses special difficulties for public interest lawyers because, in
economic terms, clients who receive free legal services do not have to
"internalize" the costs of these services. They do not face the economic
considerations that help discipline clients' decisions about how much legal
services to consume. Practical and monetary considerations necessarily
constrain the ambitions of fee-paying clients. Clients who do not have to pay
for legal services do not need to focus on the financial implications of
settlement decisions in the same way that fee-paying clients do.
Moreover, political and ideological goals, rather than strictly monetary
ones, often motivate clients in public interest cases. The potential complexity of
such goals can further complicate client decisions about when and whether to
settle. And clients who have decided to sue powerful institutions for breaches
of the public interest often may not be the "settling" type. They may have a
greater-than-average willingness to confront authority, and they may not be
disposed towards accepting their counsel's advice about when and how to end
legal confrontations. In this Article, I refer to this basic set of problems
involving non-fee-paying clients who do not want to heed their lawyers' advice
about whether to accept settlement offers as the settlement problem in public
interest law.
Following many commentators and the Supreme Court in In Re Primus,6 I
define public interest law as having two features. First, public interest law
involves legal services arrangements in which clients typically do not pay for
the services they receive, usually because they cannot afford to do so. Second,
in public interest law, attorneys typically provide legal services primarily for
public-regarding reasons rather than primarily out of pecuniary motives. Public
interest lawyers must make a living, of course, but their primary motive, as the
Supreme Court has pointed out, is to advance public justice rather than to
enrich themselves financially.7 This, indeed, was why Fiss so ardently opposed
Trubek, Public Interest Law: Facing the Problems of Maturity, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 417, 421-27 (2011) (proposing several methods, such as reducing public interest
lawyers' taxes and starting a public interest lawyers program, to help compensate public
interest lawyers and encourage more lawyers to take public interest cases); Perspectives on
Finding Personal Legal Services: The Results of a Public Opinion Poll, AM. BAR Ass'N
STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS. (Feb. 2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal aid indigentdefendants/2012/0
5/national meetingofstateaccesstojusticechairs/1s_sclaid_atj_1imited scope.authcheckdam.p
df (explaining how limited assistance programs benefit low-income clients by helping
lawyers get paid).
6. 436 U.S. 412, 429-31 (1978) (noting that the ACLU case representing indigent
women who were being involuntarily sterilized was not motivated by pecuniary gain).
7. Id. More specifically, there are two kinds of public interest lawyers. One kind
provides legal services without pay while someone other than the client pays the lawyer's
salary. These employers include the federal Legal Services Corporation, state legal aid
systems, law school clinics, and nonprofit organizations funded by donors. A second kind of
public interest lawyer supports her work solely or primarily through attorneys' fees awards.
Lawyers in the first kind of practice arrangement like receiving attorneys' fees awards to
support their work, but are not completely dependent on them and thus face less acute
4 [Vol. 29:1
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case settlement in public interest cases and why ambivalence about settlement
in this context remains: the role of public interest lawyers is or should be to
achieve public justice, rather than to simply "settle" for something less.8
Drawing from In Re Primus, Fiss, and many other sources, I use this two-part
definition of public interest law, i.e., nonpaying clients + public regarding
objectives = public interest law, for operational purposes in this Article.9
Public interest lawyers not only face potentially difficult clients, but also
confront many other difficulties in settling cases. As many critics of Fiss's anti-
settlement position have pointed out, in the real world-as opposed to Fiss's
ideal world of pure "public justice" 0-public interest lawyers confront an
imperfect and harried judiciary. Over the past several decades, the judiciary has
financial pressures of the type I discuss in this Article. Lawyers of the second type, who are
often organized into small law firms, are dependent on attorneys' fees awards to continue in
business and face the problems I write about in this Article most acutely. Both kinds of
public interest lawyers face the problem of clients who lack financial pressure in making
settlement decisions, so I discuss them together here.
8. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 1084-85.
9. This definition of public interest lawyering can be subject to critique, but it works
for the practical purposes of this Article. For a summary of the problems surrounding
definitions of public interest law, see ALAN K. CHEN & Scorr L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC
INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 5-32 (2013); see also Kathryn A.
Sabbeth, What's Money Got to Do with It?: Public Interest Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENV.
U. L. REV. 441, 442-43 (2014) (discussing definitional problems). For the purpose of this
Article, public interest lawyers refers to lawyers who: (1) represent clients who do not pay
them for their services, and (2) do so out of nonpecuniary, altruistic motives related to
promoting the public interest. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 422, 428-29, 438-39 (using this
definition of public interest lawyering). Thus, a third party may pay a public interest lawyer
to represent clients, and/or she may be hoping for attorneys' fees at the end of a successful
representation, which will help fund future cases. Id. In either situation, however, the usual
disciplining mechanism on clients of having to pay for their lawyers' services, and to pay
more for more of their lawyers' services, does not exist. As I will argue further in Part H.B.2
below, contingency fee arrangements may or may not fit within the public interest lawyering
paradigm depending on their specific terms. See infra Part II.B.2.
Closely related to public interest law is the concept of providing access to justice to the
many people who cannot afford to pay for legal representation. The U.S. Constitution
provides no right to an attorney in civil cases, and the access to justice problem in the United
States is enormous. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AGAIN, STILL
1013 (2004) (noting that approximately four-fifths of the civil needs of the poor and two to
three-fifths of the civil needs of middle income persons remain unmet); see also U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, WHITE HOUSE LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY ROUNDTABLE TOOLKIT 3 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/lair/file/82932 1/download (finding that 63 million Americans
qualify for free civil legal assistance, but more than 50% of those seeking help are turned
away for lack of resources); Natural Allies: Philanthropy and Civil Legal Aid, PUB.
WELFARE FOUND. & THE KRESGE FOUND (2013), http://www.publicwelfare.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/NaturalAllies.pdf (finding that about 80% of the serious legal needs
of low-income people do not have sufficient funding and support).
10. Professor Fiss described his ideal of public justice as best reflected the heroic work
of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., who presided over the desegregation of school districts in
Montgomery, Alabama in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2009). Judge
Johnson faced extreme hostility from his local community for his heroic work. Id. at 1273.
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crafted increasingly restrictive legal doctrines, which embody values far
different from those Professor Fiss would endorse under the public justice
banner. Public interest lawyers typically handle crushing caseloads, striving to
do the best they can for as many desperate clients as possible. Public interest
lawyers have altruistic motives; they want to help people, and they realize that
the clients who end up in their offices lack the resources to obtain legal help
elsewhere. They thus face great pressure to do as much for as many people as
possible. They commonly must perform triage among many needy clients,
while facing long odds with few resources in David-versus-Goliath-type legal
contests. 1
At the same time, public interest lawyers must sustain financially viable
practice models. Scott Cummings and Deborah Rhode have tracked public
interest lawyers' experimentation with new practice forms in response to
decreases in public funding for delivering legal services to poor and other
vulnerable populations.12 In this environment (as, indeed, in all practice
settings), settling cases offers an important avenue for resolving disputes.
Settlement may produce better results for clients than going forth with the risks
of litigating claims to final judgment.13
Legal ethics rules strictly regulate lawyers' actions in handling case
settlements. Quite properly, the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model
Rule of Professional Conduct ("Model Rule" or "MR") 1.2(a) and its state
equivalents dictate that lawyers may settle cases only when their clients
authorize them to do so.14 Moreover, as the Supreme Court has held, public
interest lawyers are ethically required to accept settlement offers that deprive
11. See Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": Triage Among Poor
Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 2487 (1999). For an analysis of how the calculation of
odds in the David versus Goliath story can be turned on its head, see MALCOM GLADWELL,
DAVID AND GOLIATH: UNDERDOGS, MISFITS, AND THE ART OF BATTLING GIANTS (2015).
12. Scott Cummings, Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 89
(2012) (noting the tradeoff private public interest lawyers face between their public interest
mission and their need to pay their bills); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The
Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REv. 2027, 2036 (2008). Other kinds of law practice have
some characteristics of public interest law. For example, traditional for-profit firms may do
pro bono work and need attorneys' fees to continue to fund such work, and some plaintiffs'-
side law firms may view themselves primarily as profit-making enterprises, yet still face
tensions between their financial interest in case settlement and their ethical obligations to
clients. See Howard M. Erichson, Settlement in the Absence of Anticipated Adjudication, 85
FORDHAM L. REv. 2017, 2022-23 (2017) (discussing conflicts of interest lawyers face in
court-awarded attorneys' fee cases as a general matter).
13. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-
Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 65, 67 (2010) (reporting on how civil rights cases are particularly
vulnerable to dismissal under the Court's new pleading standards); Paul Reingold, Requiem
for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 11 (2008) (examining various ways in
which the Court's developing jurisprudence has rendered public interest litigation
unsustainable).
14. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2014) (stating that "[a]
lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter").
6 [Vol. 29:1
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lawyers of statutory attorneys' fees when this is best for their clients or when
their clients want them to do so.15 Many critics have argued that the Court's
picture of public interest lawyers as able to continue to practice despite
receiving no payment for their services when they settle cases ignores practice
reality.16 Public interest lawyers who rely on attorneys' fees can continue to
practice only if they are able to receive the attorneys' fees Congress has
authorized. Congress has done so in more than one hundred statutes that shift
attorneys' fees to plaintiffs when they have successfully pursued cases affecting
the public interest in areas such as civil rights, environmental law, and
whistleblower protection.17
This Article addresses the basic but pressing legal ethics problems public
interest lawyers face when non-fee-paying clients do not want to accept
lawyers' settlement advice.18 After analyzing the problem, this Article offers
several ethically permissible paths towards a solution. Part I addresses the law
under MR 1.2(a) and other legal ethics rules.19 These rules provide a legal
baseline for how the settlement problems in public interest law can be
addressed. The rules state that clients must have unrestrained rights to instruct
their lawyers as to settlement. Lawyers who disregard this principle face
potential disciplinary consequences, and no lawyer should risk this, no matter
how frustrating settlement problems in public interest law may be. This does
not necessarily mean, however, that public interest lawyers must accede to
unreasonable demands. Just as in any other representation, lawyers who agree
to represent non-fee-paying clients are entitled to legally appropriate
protections against clients monopolizing their time, efforts, and other limited
resources in pursuit of unreasonable or unattainable goals. In public interest
representations, the costs of client unreasonableness fall on lawyers' shoulders
(as well as other potential clients in need of services). Solutions must be found
that shift these costs away from lawyers (and, indirectly, other clients). Such
15. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1986). This Article discusses in detail the
problems posed after the Court's decision in Evans v. JeffD. in Part II.B.1 below.
16. See, e.g., David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive
Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 209, 241-45 (2003) (presenting an important
critique of Evans v. JeffD.). See also sources cited infra note 55.
17. For a discussion of these many attorneys' fees statutes, see generally HENRY
COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 94-970, AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES BY
FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES (June 20, 2008), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-
970.pdf.
18. On the "flip side" problem of the client who wishes to settle rather than litigate to
judgment, see supra note 4, the answer would in most circumstances be the same: lawyers
must abide by their client's decisions on settlement, even if the client has previously bound
herself in a retainer agreement to handle settlement in a different way, as I discuss infra Part
I.
19. In the United States, which will be my focus here, most jurisdictions in general
terms follow the ABA Model Rules. Each state adopts its own version of these rules, so the
precise language of the applicable rules may vary depending on jurisdiction. On the legal
ethics principles regarding case settlement, most jurisdictions track the Model Rules, so I
cite to them throughout this Article.
2018] 7
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solutions must reconcile the important interests on all sides of the problem.
They should preserve the legal ethics principle that grants primacy to clients'
rights to make settlement decisions. At the same time, they should protect
lawyers' traditional rights to shape the duration, costs, and structure of the legal
representations they provide.
Part II outlines three such possible approaches. They involve: (A) crafting
limited scope or duration representation agreements more often in public
interest representations, (B) designing representation agreements that reduce
clients' obliviousness to the costs of lawyers' services by imposing some
expenses on clients in protracted representation scenarios, and (C) adopting
representation arrangements that transfer responsibility for funding and for the
risks of irrational settlement decisions away from lawyers and to third-party
payers.
I. WHAT LAWYERS MAY NOT Do
Before examining what lawyers ethically may do in the face of settlement
problems in public interest law, it is helpful to examine in some detail existing
law on what lawyers cannot do to interfere with clients' control of settlement
decisions in their cases. Abundant law addresses the prohibitions on:
(A) lawyer control over client settlement decisions, (B) lawyer use of retainer
agreement provisions to alter the default allocation of decision-making to
clients, and (C) lawyer withdrawal from a case following a client's rejection of
a lawyer's advice about settlement.
A. Lawyers May Not Take Away Clients' Rights to Make Settlement
Decisions
Model Rule 1.2(a) states, in no uncertain terms, that clients, not lawyers,
have the right to make settlement decisions in their cases. Lawyers may and
should advise their clients about settlement offers, but the ultimate decision is
for the client to make, even if the lawyer thinks it ill advised. Thus, in plain
language, this rule states that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to settle a matter."20
There is no wiggle room in this default allocation of decision-making
authority about settlement between client and lawyer. Moreover, as I will
explain below, the case law makes it clear that this default allocation may not
be changed by agreement-i.e., in the case of a contract for the provision of
legal services, through the parties' retainer agreement. The matter is one of
inalienable right, not contract.
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983).
8 [Vol. 29:1
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B. Lawyers May Not Vary the Allocation ofDecision-Making Authority
on Settlement through Contract
Although I have met public interest lawyers who want to argue to the
contrary, the overwhelming weight of legal authority provides that retainer
agreements cannot alter the allocation in MR 1.2(a) of settlement decision-
making authority between lawyer and client. In other words, lawyers and
clients may not by agreement alter the policy embodied in MR 1.2(a).
When courts examine retainer agreements that purport to give an attorney
control over settlement decisions in a particular case, they typically declare
such agreements contrary to the applicable state rules of professional
responsibility, and/or contrary to public policy, and thus void.2 1 Even more to
the point, courts sometimes find lawyers who have improperly contracted with
clients in this way to have violated the applicable state rules of professional
responsibility.22 State legal ethics committees routinely reach the same result.2 3
21. See, e.g., Walton v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 149 S.W.3d 834, 843 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2004) (clients have the right to decide whether to accept a settlement offer under
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.02(a)(2), and "a fee agreement may not
contain a provision that infringes on this right"), on reh'g, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006),
vacated as moot due to settlement, 2007 WL 416694 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Parents Against
Drunk Drivers v. Graystone Pines Homeowners' Ass'n, 789 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (declaring that fee agreements that give attorneys control over the settlement of
clients' cases are contrary to the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility as well as
contrary to public policy and thus void).
22. See, e.g., In re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84-85 (D. Conn. 2001)
(finding, in a case a judge referred to the Grievance Committee of the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut, that an attorney's conduct in using a written fee
agreement that delegated all settlement authority to the attorney violated the Connecticut
Rules of Professional Conduct); In re Coleman, 295 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)
(holding that a lawyer improperly contracted with his client for the exclusive right to settle
her case without her consent, violating Missouri Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.2(a), by
including a provision in the retainer agreement stating that "you agree I shall have the
exclusive right to determine when and for how much to settle this case. That way, I am not
held hostage to an agreement I disagree with").
For some cases reaching contrary results, see Alex B. Long, Attorney-Client Fee
Agreements that Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REv. 287, 312-15 (2009) (noting that some
courts have not disciplined lawyers for such provisions, but arguing that lawyers who
include such provisions have engaged in "serious misconduct").
23. See, e.g., OH Adv. Op. 2010-6, 2010 WL 4038613, at *3 (Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs
on Grievances & Discipline 2010) (stating that, "[a]s required by Prof. Cond. Rule 1.2(a) and
as explained in Comment [1], a decision to settle must be made by the client, not the lawyer.
Further, as required by Prof Cond. Rule 1.4(b), there is a duty for a lawyer to explain a
matter so that a client is able to make an informed decision. Neither of these rules is fulfilled
when a client signs a contingent fee agreement at the onset of representation granting the
attorney authority to take action and execute the documents the attorney deems necessary in
the matter, including the settlement of a matter"); Lawyer Approval of Settlement, RPC145
(N.C. State Bar 1993), https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/adopted-opinions/rpc-145
(concluding that a lawyer may not include language in an employment agreement with a
client that divests the client of her exclusive authority to decide whether to settle her case);
Utah Opinion No. 98-05 (1998) (stating that the client must have the final say on settlement
and this ultimate client authority cannot be contracted away).
20181] 9
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The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers and the ABA Section of
Litigation's Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations say the same.24
Nor are the disciplinary consequences insignificant. Courts that discover
that lawyers have used retainer provisions in which clients purportedly assign
the right to make settlement decisions to their lawyers may suspend from
practice the lawyer involved.25 Although the law is clear on this point, some
public interest lawyers do use this approach to insure against runaway client
decisions. I have not attempted to investigate systematically how often such
arrangements are offered to clients for the simple reason that I would find
myself ethically compromised if I knew that this practice was occurring despite
the rules of professional conduct that forbid it. Suffice it to say that public
interest lawyers expose themselves to potential legal ethics censure if they
attempt to assign the right to make settlement decisions to themselves through
retainer agreements.
C. Lawyers May Not Contract with Clients for the Right to Withdraw
Following Rejection of Settlement Advice
Another approach public interest lawyers may consider is asking clients to
agree, at the start of a representation, to consent to their lawyer's withdrawal
from the client's representation if the client rejects the lawyer's settlement
advice. To determine the legality of this approach, one must turn to the rules of
professional conduct governing a lawyer's withdrawal from client
representation. Those rules typically divide the considerations that apply to
lawyer withdrawal into two categories, one involving a lawyer's potential
mandatory duty to withdraw, and the second dealing with situations in which
withdrawal might be permissible. The conditions for mandatory withdrawal
exist only when a lawyer's continued representation of a client would result in
24. See RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 cmt. c (2000) (stating that
lawyers are prohibited from irrevocable contracts stating that the lawyer will decide on the
terms of settlement); Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Litig., ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS § 3.2.3, "Avoiding Limitations on Client's Ultimate Settlement Authority"
(Aug. 2002) (hereinafter ABA LITIGATION SECTION ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT]
("A lawyer should not seek the client's consent to, or enter into, a retainer or other
agreement that purports o . . . grant the lawyer irrevocable authorization to settle"); id., at 16
("Conditioning agreement to representation on a waiver of the client's right to approve a
future settlement, or on the client's agreement not to settle without the lawyer's approval,
would fundamentally and impermissibly alter the lawyer-client relationship and deprive the
client of ultimate control of the litigation. A lawyer's insistence on such a provision would
seem calculated to place the lawyer's interests ahead of the client's interests, and is
potentially coercive.").
25. See, e.g., In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114, 1115 (Ind. 1997) (suspending a lawyer
for entering into an agreement with his client which, inter alia, improperly stated that clients
"hereby authorize our attorney to settle this matter for any amount he determines is
reasonable without further oral or written authorization."); In re Coleman, 295 S.W.3d at
864 (suspending a lawyer for one year for improperly including retainer agreement language
under which the client gave up her right to decide whether to settle her case).
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the lawyer violating the rules of professional conduct or other law, or when a
client wants to fire her lawyer. These conditions probably will not exist in most
situations in which a client has simply rejected settlement advice.26 The factors
supporting permissive withdrawal may be more promising, however, since they
include situations in which "the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement"; when "the representation will result in an unreasonable
financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by
the client"; or when "other good cause for withdrawal exists."27 Some or all of
these factors may well exist when a client and a public interest lawyer have
disagreed about a lawyer's settlement advice. Thus, there would be no apparent
ethical problem in a lawyer asking to withdraw from a client representation
after a client refuses settlement advice on grounds of financial burden,
fundamental disagreement with e client, or, in some situations, the client
having rendered the representation unreasonably difficult. The hitch is whether
this approach will be successful, which is a question of a different order.
There are important kickers to Model Rule 1.16(b), however. First, as
stated in MR 1.16(b)(1), withdrawal must not have a material adverse effect on
the interests of the client. Second, as stated in Model Rule 1.16(c), "[a] lawyer
must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal
when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a
lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for
terminating the representation."28 As lawyers know all too well from practice
experience, courts are loath to grant permission to terminate representations
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (1983), "Mandatory Withdrawal,"
states:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or
other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to
represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (1983), "Permissive Withdrawal,"
(4), (6) & (7). The full text of MR. 1.16 (b) states:
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of
the client;
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with
which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;
(5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the
lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw
unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or
has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (1983).
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when a case is ongoing-especially if the client cannot pay for substitute
counsel and thus is unlikely to secure any. From the perspective of judges, it is
in the interests of justice to order lawyers to continue handling matters
presently before the court, even if those lawyers are less than pleased to be
doing so. Courts know that they can typically count on lawyers' ethics and
professionalism to do a good job anyway.
Thus, a provision in a retainer agreement purporting to bind a client to
agree to a lawyer's permissive withdrawal from her case if she and her lawyer
disagree about settlement is not likely to meet with the court's sympathy. The
lawyer and client cannot contract out of the lawyer's duty to request permission
from the tribunal before withdrawing on non-mandatory grounds. The lawyer
may request permission to withdraw from a case where a client refuses to
accept settlement advice, provided the lawyer can do so without material
adverse effect on the client. In public interest cases where a client has little
chance of finding other counsel, this condition may often not be satisfied ab
initio. But, even if the lawyer believes she can withdraw without any material
adverse effect on the client, judges' institutional incentives are to deny
permission to withdraw based on justifiable concerns about the smooth
functioning of the judicial system. Granting the lawyer permission to withdraw
leaves the lawyer's client pro se and thus becomes the judge's problem. From
courts' institutional perspective, lawyers are officers of the court and have the
responsibility to help its processes run smoothly.2 9
If legal ethics analysis led only this far, there would be no particular harm
in including retainer agreement provisions under which clients purport to give
consent to lawyer withdrawal in the event of a disagreement about whether to
settle; the provision simply might not be enforced. But some legal authorities
point to a more troublesome conclusion. When asked to focus on specific
retainer agreement provisions in which clients purportedly promise that they
will consent to their lawyer's withdrawal from representation in the event of a
dispute about settlement, some courts and ethics committees conclude that
lawyers have violated the professional rules in putting such a provision in their
retainer agreement.30 Decision-makers in these cases reason that such
29. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. C-455 (1961)
(concluding, under Model Rules predecessor Canon 44, that a client's refusal to settle does
not constitute good cause for withdrawing from the representation); see also May v. Seibert,
164 W. Va. 673, 679 (1980) ("No cases are cited and we have found none that state that
refusal by a client to accept a "reasonable" settlement is good cause for withdrawal. [String
of case citations omitted] state that withdrawal because a client refuses to accept a settlement
is unjustified."). There are, of course, many contrary authorities in which courts do grant
lawyers permission to withdrawal from representations, but in many of these cases it is a
host of difficult client behaviors, such as refusing to cooperate with counsel, that constitute
the grounds for permissive withdrawal. See, e.g., Team Obsolete Ltd. v. A.H.R.M.A. Ltd.,
464 F. Supp. 2d 164, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that client's refusal to pay legal fees
warranted lawyer's withdrawal from the representation).
30. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. On Prof'1 Ethics, Informal Op. 95-24 (1994),
1995 WL 18241185 (a provision in a fee agreement that gives the attorney the absolute right
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agreements are unduly coercive and in essence take settlement decisions away
from clients-especially clients who cannot pay for substitute counsel since
those clients will effectively be unable to proceed without their lawyers'
representation. On this reasoning, the client may be coerced by their lawyer's
imminent withdrawal to accept the lawyer's settlement advice they otherwise
would want to reject.31
One might argue against the reasoning in these cases, but it nevertheless
reflects the view of some courts and other legal ethics authorities. In light of
these opinions, the possibility exists that a court considering a lawyer's request
to withdraw from representation might discipline the lawyer if the lawyer
points to an agreement under which the client has purported to grant advance
consent to the lawyer's withdrawal if the client refuses settlement advice. The
practice of including such provisions in retainer agreements hould thus be
avoided. The lawyer clearly may ethically request permission to withdraw, but
runs the risk of censure if she purports to obtain advance consent from ithe
client for such withdrawal. Other solutions must be found instead.
II. WHAT LAWYERS MAY Do
This Part will consider other possible approaches to the settlement problem
in public interest law. It proposes several possible avenues for solution, each
attacking different aspects of the problem. One aspect of the problem, as noted
above, is the lack of effective limitations on the scope and duration of the
lawyer's duty to provide legal services. Another aspect of the problem is the
lack of financial incentives on the client who is not paying for services. A third
is the coupling of the lawyer's resources with the client's decisions, which is
to withdraw if the client refuses to accept a settlement proposal the attorney thinks should be
accepted violates the Rules of Professional Conduct because it diminishes the client's right
to decide whether to settle and on what basis); Mich. Eth. Op. C-233 (1984),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute resolution/settle
mentnegotiations.authcheckdam.pdf (under the Michigan ethics rules, it was unethical for a
staff attorney of a group legal services plan to require a client to sign an "authorization to
settle" form with an amount indicated and to grant the lawyer permission to move to
withdraw from the representation if the client refused to settle for that amount); cf Florida
Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1992) (disciplining an attorney who had moved
to withdraw over the client's objection, stating that "it is also the Court's view that any
contingency fee contract which permits the attorney to withdraw from representation without
fault on the part of the client or other just reason, and purports to allow the attorney to collect
a fee for services already rendered would be unenforceable and unethical.").
31. See, e.g., Conn. Bar. Ass'n Comm. On Prof 1 Ethics, Informal Op. 95-24, supra
note 30; ABA LITIGATION SECTION ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS,
supra note 2424 § 3.2.3 ("A lawyer should not seek the client's consent to, or enter into, a
retainer or other agreement that purports to (a) grant the lawyer irrevocable authorization to
settle; (b) authorize the lawyer to withdraw if the client refuses the lawyer's recommendation
to settle; (c) require the lawyer's assent before the client can settle; or (d) otherwise attempt
to relieve the lawyer of ethical obligations.").
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not the usual situation in fee-for-services arrangements. This Part proposes
solutions targeted to each of these aspects of the problem in turn.
A. Lawyers May Limit the Scope and Duration of Their Representation
Obligations
To recap the analysis offered thus far, one aspect of the settlement problem
facing public interest lawyers is the lack of reasonable limits to the duration or
scope of the lawyer's duty to provide legal services to the client. The reason
this tends to be more of a problem in public interest law than in fee-for-service
arrangements is that having to pay for legal services tends to discipline client
desires, yet no such disciplining mechanism exists when the client is not paying
for services. This formulation of the problem suggests a solution. If the
problem is a lack of limitations on the scope and/or duration of the lawyer's
services, then perhaps a solution can be for public interest lawyers to exercise
options that typically allow lawyers to limit the scope and/or duration of the
services they provide clients.
Model Rule 1.2(c), as embodied in similar rules adopted by the states,
articulates the applicable principle. That rule states that "[a] lawyer may limit
the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent."3 2 At a basic level, there
is nothing novel or controversial about this principle; virtually all legal
representations are limited in scope to some degree. Lawyers and clients
together define the scope of the legal problem or problems they intend for the
lawyer to address, and lawyers then typically draft a provision defining the
scope of the representation being undertaken, which they include in the retainer
agreement they offer the client.
What is more novel and somewhat more controversial are experiments
innovators in the access to justice movement have undertaken. These
innovators seek to push the bounds of the limited scope representation concept.
They champion "unbundling" various aspects of the legal services lawyers
typically provide clients in order to lower the cost of legal services. The idea is
that clients can agree to receive only some aspects of the legal services lawyers
generally perform.3 3 Thus, for example, a client might represent herself in court
pro se, yet seek limited legal help from a lawyer in drafting pleadings she must
submit to the court. Or, as often happens in traditional representations, a client
might pay a lawyer for an initial consultation on a matter but then not retain the
lawyer for subsequent representation throughout the legal process in which it
will be resolved.
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (1983).
33. See generally, AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LITIG., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE
LEGAL ASSISTANCE: A REPORT OF THE MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, http://www.americanbar
.org/groups/delivery legalservices/resources.html.
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Unbundled legal services arrangements must meet the ethics requirements
for any representation arrangement. Most significantly, as the comments to
Model Rule 1.2 (c) advise, "[a]lthough this Rule affords the lawyer and client
substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable
under the circumstances."34 The lawyer still has the "duty to provide competent
representation,"35 and all of the other ethics considerations laid out in the rules
of professional conduct typically also apply, including the duties of
confidentiality, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and the like.
Members of the access to justice movement have worked to educate courts
about the benefits of permitting limited representation arrangements. They have
convinced some courts to adopt reforms on a variety of issues, including
permitting ghostwriting of pleading for pro se plaintiffs.36 In some but notall
states, access to justice advocates have persuaded courts to adopt new rules that
explicitly permit and lay out various requirements for unbundled or limited
legal services arrangements.3 7 To give just a few examples, Califomia and
Kansas allow limited scope legal services arrangements for some but not all
types of cases. These jurisdictions usually permit such arrangements in cases in
which pro se representation is common, such as consumer law, wills and
estates, bankruptcy, domestic violence, and divorce.38 Other states allow
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) cmt. 7 (1983).
35. Id. Comment 7 further states, "for example, if a client's objective is limited to
securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and
typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's
services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would
not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client
could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer
from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered
when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1."
36. In Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, a lawyer who drafts or assists in drafting pleadings or other
documents for a client must specify in the pleading or other documents that they are
prepared with the assistance of a counsel. See FL. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.2; IOWA R. Civ. P.,
1.423(1); LA. DIST. CT. R. 9.12; Ks. SUP. CT. 115A(c); MASSACHUSErrS SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT ORDER REGARDING LIMITED ASSISTANCE REPRESENTATION, http://www.mass.gov/
courts/case-legal-res/rules-of-court/sjc/lar.html; NEB. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT 501.2(c); N.H.
SUPER. CT. R. Civ. R. 17(g); Wi. Sup. CT. R. 1.2(cm); Wyo. R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt.
7. However, in Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, and Montana, a lawyer can help pro se
litigants prepare pleadings and other court documents without informing the court that the
documents are prepared by a lawyer. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137; Miss. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT
R. 1.2(c) cmt.; Mo. R. CIv. P. 55.03(a); MONT. R. Civ. P. 11. In California, a lawyer can
assist a client in drafting legal documents without disclosing the lawyer's identity on the
documents, but must notify the court about the limited scope representation if the lawyer is
to appear in court. CAL. R. CT. 3.37.
37. See Appendix A infra (summarizing these rules).
38. See, e.g., Superior Court of the District of Columbia Administrative Order 14-10,
Limited Appearances in the Civil Division, Probate Division, Tax Division, Family Court,
and Domestic Violence Unit - Supersedes Administrative Order, Nos. 08-02, 11-07 and 12-
08D.C [hereinafter Superior Court of the District of Columbia Administrative Order 14-10]
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limited scope representations in all cases but with controls. The Illinois
Superior Court, for example, permits attorneys to file a "Notice of Limited
Scope Appearance" that identifies "each aspect of the proceeding to which the
limited scope appearance pertains."39 This Notice of Limited Scope
Appearance gives attorneys the opportunity to: limit their appearance to
specific proceedings, clarify that the representation does not extend to all
matters within the proceedings, and identify the discrete issues within a
proceeding that are governed by the appearance.40 Similarly, the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia provides that in some of its divisions an
attorney may limit an appearance in court to a specific date, time period,
activity, or subject matter, by filing a Notice of Limited Appearance with the
clerk of the court.4 1
Most states require a lawyer who offers limited representation to notify the
court, the opposing counsel, and all of the parties involved in the case of the
scope, subject matter, and time period of the limited representation.42 States
differ widely in their requirements for terminating a limited scope
representation, with some states requiring no more than the filing of a notice of
completion but others imposing more onerous steps.43 Thus, various
(June 16, 2014) (allowing limited scope representation in the civil division, probate division,
tax division, family court, and the domestic violence unit, but not in jury trials; attorneys
who accept representation in a matter that continues to a jury trial must either withdraw
before voir dire begins or continue representation through t e return of the verdict).
39. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 13.
40. Id. The rule further states that the non-attorney remains responsible for any matter
not specifically identified in the Notice of Limited Scope Appearance.
41. Superior Court of the District of Columbia Administrative Order 14-10. Other
states that explicitly permit a lawyer to enter a limited appearance in court as long as the
lawyer files a notice of limited appearance prior to or simultaneously with the proceeding
include Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, and
Washington. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 121; IND. R. TRIAL P. 3.1; IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.404(3); KS.
SUP. CT. R. 115A(b)(1); Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Order Regarding Limited
Assistance Representation (effective May 1, 2009), http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-
res/rules-of-court/sjc/lar.html; Miss. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 1.2(c); MONT. R. Civ: P.4.1(c);
WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 4.2. California allows limited appearance in civil proceedings
only, particularly in family court. See CAL. R. CT.3.35-3.36. Maine allows a lawyer to file a
limited appearance only if the client consents in writing. ME. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.2(c).
Maryland requires a lawyer who enters limited appearance to submit a form of
acknowledgement of the scope of limited representation. MD. R. P.2-131.
42. See ABA Standing Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Services, Rules, AM. BAR
Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/deliverylegalservices/resources/prose unbun
dling resourcecenter/court rules.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). These additional states
include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, North Dakota,
and Washington. Id.
43. To withdraw from a limited-scope representation in most states, including Alaska,
Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming, a lawyer is required to file a notice of
completion of representation and serve it on all parties involved. See Ks. SUP. CT. R.
115A(b)(6); MD. R. P. 2-132; Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Order Regarding
Limited Assistance Representation, http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/rules-of-
court/sjc/lar.html; Nebraska Court Rules of Pleading in Civil Cases Rule 6-1109(i); N.M. R.
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jurisdictions approve of different degrees of limited scope representation,
ranging from an attorney's very short-term and behind-the-scenes giving of
help to an otherwise pro se litigant to far more complex and robust
arrangements that eventually approach the typical full-service yet limited-scope
representations lawyers traditionally provide.
In classic public interest areas involving civil rights or "Section 1983"
litigation, such as police misconduct and anti-discrimination cases, as well as
whistleblower lawsuits and the like, I have found little evidence that limited
scope representation has taken on noticeable popularity once past the stage of
the filing of a complaint. (Prior to filing a complaint, of course, there is much
limited scope representation in all matters, in fact, if not in name, as lawyers
meet with prospective clients to determine whether to take their cases and, if
so, to advise on the feasibility of litigation and other preliminary matters.) The
most likely reason there is no particularly noticeable uptick in parties' use of
limited scope representation arrangements in classic civil rights and other
public interest representations is that such cases tend to be complex; they are
not the type of relatively straightforward matters for which innovators first
designed the unbundled legal services concept. Yet it bears exploring whether
certain types of limited scope representation agreements might be helpful to
Civ. P.1-089(C); TENN. R. Civ. P. 11.01; UTAH R. CIv. P.74(b); VT. R. Civ. P. 79.1(3);
WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 70.1; Wyo. U.R.D.C.102(a)(2)(C). Similarly, in Colorado,
Florida, and Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, and Nebraska, a lawyer is allowed to terminate
representation without leave of court as long as the lawyer files a notice of completion of
limited appearance. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 121(5) cmt.; FLA. FAM. L.R.P.12.040(b)-(c); IDAHO
R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(5); IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.404(4); NEB. CT. R. PLDG. 6-1109(i). In Connecticut,
when a lawyer has filed a notice of limited appearance and has completed the representation
described in the limited appearance, the lawyer is not required to obtain permission of the
tribunal to terminate the representation before filing the certificate of completion. See CONN.
R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.16 cmt. In Illinois, there are two alternative ways for an attorney to
withdraw when the limited representation has been completed. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 13 (c)(7)
cmts. The first method, an oral motion, can be used whenever the representation is
completed or before a hearing attended by the party the attorney represents. Prior notice of
such a hearing is not required. The second method, filing a "Notice of Withdrawal of
Limited Scope Appearance," allows the attorney to withdraw without having to make a court
appearance, except when there is a genuine dispute about the attorney's completion of the
representation. The notice must be served on the presiding judge, the parties involved, and
other counsel in the case. Id. In Maine, a lawyer is exempt from the standard withdrawal
procedure and may automatically withdraw upon completion of representation. See ME. R.
Civ. P. 89(a). Some states impose more onerous requirements for withdrawing from limited
representation, such as requiring new permission from the client, the court and/or other
parties in the case. In Arizona, for example, a lawyer must file a "Notice of Withdrawal,"
signed by both the lawyer and the client, to withdraw from representation or, if the client
does not consent, the lawyer must file a motion to withdraw. See ARIZONA R. Civ. P. 5.2(c).
In California, in order to withdraw from a limited scope representation a lawyer must file
with the court an "Application to Be Relieved as Counsel Upon Completion of Limited
Scope Representation," and serve this application on all parties in the case. See CAL. R. CT.
3.36 (e) and (h). If a party to the case files an objection against the lawyer's withdrawal, the
court must schedule a hearing no later than 25 days from the date the objection is filed. CAL.
R. CT. (g).
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public interest lawyers seeking to avoid the settlement problem in public
interest law, even in complex cases.
Several types of limited scope arrangements might work along these lines.
For example, a lawyer can certainly limit her obligations to a client by agreeing
at the outset only to provide an initial consultation to discuss the law applying
to the case. The lawyer in this scenario should define this limited scope
representation agreement in writing. There is no ethical proscription against
such an agreement, provided the lawyer meets all other ethical duties including
the duty to do adequate legal research and investigation of the facts.4 Lawyers
routinely enter into such limited scope representations in all areas of law.
Another relatively straightforward limited representation arrangement in
many cases would have a lawyer agree to represent a client through initial
negotiations with an opposing party to attempt to resolve a dispute before
formal filing of a complaint with the relevant adjudicatory tribunal. It is
common knowledge that this type of representation agreement occurs
frequently; in legal practice outside the public interest context, no one would
think it odd or possibly impermissible for a lawyer and client to contract for
this type of legal service before or without committing to full-scale litigation.45
If lawyers can contract with fee-paying clients for this type of limited-scope
obligation, there would appear to be no reason they could not do so in public
interest practice.
To be sure, when a client cannot afford to pay for legal services, he has far
fewer (or even no other) options for obtaining a lawyer to represent him in
litigation if negotiations to resolve the dispute fail. But there is no reason that a
public interest lawyer who has agreed to represent a client through negotiations
but no further should have more obligation to continue representation than
lawyers with fee-paying clients do. To conclude otherwise is to impose stricter
requirements on public interest lawyers than other members of the bar. On this
issue, as on others I will discuss below, courts should avoid treating public
interest lawyers representing vulnerable clients differently than other lawyers.
Imposing stricter requirements on public interest lawyers has the perverse
effect of making it harder for them to practice and, in the long run, limiting the
availability of legal services for the very people the courts are trying to protect.
In short, all lawyers have an obligation to reach agreements with clients
about a reasonable scope of representation after informed consent.4 6 If it is
reasonable for a fee-for-service lawyer to agree to represent a client through
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) cmt. 6 (1983).
45. Cf Id. ("A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited
objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is
undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the
client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly .
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (1983).
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negotiations but not beyond, as it undoubtedly can be for many reasons,4 7 then
it is likewise reasonable for a public interest lawyer to do so. This lawyer's
client may not find someone to handle her litigation if negotiations fail, but that
would be the case even if the lawyer had not agreed to provide limited-scope
representation. The client is better off than she would be if she had no lawyer at
all. Clients without financial means may be forced to choose between less than
ideal options, but this is true of most choices individuals make. Within the
bounds of all other applicable ethical rules, the client's financial dilemma
should not mandate that the public interest lawyer take on a commitment
broader or longer than that required in other client scenarios.
As already noted, public interest lawyers do not often avail themselves of
the option of limited-scope representation in the phase prior to the formal filing
of a case in court. They may choose not to do so out of concerns about
protecting especially vulnerable clients; they may, for example, worry about
"abandoning" a client if negotiations fail. But here as in other scenarios I will
discuss below, the public interest lawyer might be counseled to keep in mind
her obligations to other present and future clients, as well as the limits on
resources and time she faces. Getting in too deep with one client may impinge
on her ethical duties to other clients, as well as other aspects of ethical
prudence in sustaining her law practice in the long term. Just as fee-for-service
lawyers in the United States have the right to select their clients and define the
scope of the legal representation they offer the clients they choose to represent,
public interest lawyers should exercise prudent discretion on these matters as
well. Public interest lawyers, like all lawyers, have the right to husband
resources, time, and energy, and to attend to the financial health of their
practice. One way they can do so is by making prudent decisions, within
reasonable limits, about the scope and duration of the legal representation they
offer worthy clients.
In the scenario discussed above, the client agrees, after informed consent,
to accept a representation arrangement that ends before litigation starts. Thus,
the lawyer has not yet filed a notice of appearance before a tribunal. This leaves
limited scope representation fairly straightforward. Once a lawyer files a notice
of appearance, however, the relevant tribunal begins to monitor the process
through which the parties' dispute will be resolved, and this adds a further layer
of complexity. The filing of a case triggers an outside adjudicator's
involvement, and different considerations come into play. The adjudicator
typically has the power to order the lawyer to continue representation. The
lawyer must not only attend to ethics considerations, but also must consider her
actions from the perspective of the adjudicator, who can exercise discretionary
47. In the context of fee-paying clients, for example, a lawyer might not specialize in
litigation, might have too many other pending matters to commit to full litigation for a new
client, or might regard litigation as too much of a long shot. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) cmt. 6 (1983) ("Such limitations may exclude actions that ... the lawyer
regards as ... imprudent").
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authority to order the lawyer to be especially solicitous of the client's needs,
especially when the client cannot afford to obtain alternative representation.
Although judges sometimes order lawyers to continue to represent clients
that cannot pay for legal services, as already noted in Part I.C above, courts'
approval of limited scope representation arrangements should make it possible
for public interest lawyers to limit the duration of their representation of clients
even after a case has been formally filed. This is especially true in the many
jurisdictions that specifically allow limited scope representation arrangements,
as documented in Appendix A. In Illinois and the District of Columbia, for
example, a lawyer can, after obtaining informed consent, offer a client a
retainer agreement hat states that she will file a notice of limited representation
and handle the client's case through the pleadings and dispositive motions
stage, including motions to dismiss and summary judgment, but then withdraw
from representing the client even if the case is set for trial (but before voir dire
commences). Such arrangements provide the lawyer the option of terminating
representation prior to trying a case that appears difficult or impossible to win
after discovery. The client obtains limited duration legal services-in other
words, the lawyer provides services for only a limited period of time, so that
the lawyer avoids taking on the obligation to represent he client indefinitely.4 8
There are, to be sure, some problems with limited duration representation
arrangements. Most obviously, since most jurisdictions require a lawyer to file
"a notice of limited representation," which defines how the lawyer will limit
her representation, the lawyer has in a sense shown her hand to opposing
counsel. Opposing counsel knows that, if his client survives the stage of
dispositive motions, there is likely to be no lawyer to take the case through
trial. This may reduce opposing counsel's interest in settling.
This potential problem should not deter use of limited appearance
arrangements, however. A plaintiff who survives the dispositive motions stage,
where the vast majority of public interest cases are resolved, has shown herself
to have a winnable case, which other lawyers may be interested in handling at
trial. In fee-for-service arrangements, too, litigators frequently hand off cases to
trial experts, so transition of counsel at the trial stage is not unusual. Moreover,
the lawyer who has filed a notice of limited appearance may choose to continue
with the *case by filing a new notice of appearance.
What the limited appearance arrangement offers the public interest lawyer
is a chance to end a client representation after reaching the end of a given stage
of litigation. By obtaining informed consent to this arrangement from the client
before the representation begins, the lawyer has the option of controlling the
48. Tom Williamson, From the President: Limited Scope Representation: Progress
and Prudence, Washington Lawyer (2013), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
publications/washington-lawyer/articles/june-2013-from-the-president.cfm (defining limited
scope representation as "a relationship between a lawyer and a client in which they agree
that the scope of the legal services will be limited to a specific duration, task(s), or subject
matter;" in other words, limited duration representation is one kind of limited scope
representation, which limits the lawyer's representation by time).
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duration of her involvement. The arrangement might not be as beneficial to the
client as a full service representation, but that is not the standard M.R. 1.2(c)
defines; that standard calls for determining the reasonableness of the limited
scope representation arrangement.49 Where the arrangement is reasonable, the
client is certainly much better off with a limited duration arrangement than he
is without any such arrangement.50 Rules applications that require public
interest lawyers to represent clients to the bitter end of every case in which they
become involved deprive other worthy clients of that lawyer's services for the
duration of the period in which the lawyer's time is bound to the first client's
cause. If fee-for-service lawyers and their clients can enter into limited scope
representation arrangements, about which there is no doubt, then public interest
lawyers and clients should be able to do so too. To reach a different conclusion
is to impose unreasonable and counterproductive additional demands on public
interest lawyers, which, in the end, reduce rather than increase the availability
of legal services to low-income clients.
All of this is not to say that there are not limits to how public interest
lawyers can ethically use limited scope or limited duration representation
agreements. One clear limit brings us back to a lawyer's use of a limited scope
representation arrangement in a way that would pressure a client to accept a
settlement. For all of the reasons already discussed in Part I above, a lawyer
ethically should not tie the termination point for a limited scope representation
to a client's decision on settlement, or even to the existence of a settlement
offer. To tie termination of a representation agreement o settlement is arguably
to commit the very type of ethics breach in violation of MR 1.2(a) that courts
have disapproved in the many other permutations discussed in Part I.
In short, this Part has argued that public interest lawyers may enter into
limited duration representation agreements, provided they are reasonable. To
reach this conclusion is not to predict that all courts will always understand and
accept such arrangements. There is still a risk that courts that have not been
well educated about the permissibility of unbundled legal services
arrangements will reject a limited duration notice of appearance and/or order a
lawyer to continue representing a client beyond the bounds of the limited scope
representation agreement where, in the eyes of the court, doing so would serve
the justice process. Thus, public interest lawyers must be careful to comply
with the requirements for limited scope representation that the rules of the
relevant jurisdiction impose, proceed cautiously and candidly with full
disclosures to the court and to opposing counsel, and continue to work to
educate the judiciary on the need for limited scope representation options in
public interest cases.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c).
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) cmt. 7 (articulating the standard
of reasonableness for limited scope representation).
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B. Lawyers May Recoup Fees for Client Representations
As noted earlier, the settlement problem in public interest law arises from
several factors. The first, regarding the lack of limits on the scope and duration
of the public interest lawyer's representation obligation to client, has been
addressed in Part II.A above. The second, regarding the potentially perverse
financial incentives created for clients receiving free services, will be discussed
in this Part.
If public interest lawyers must accept their client's decisions about
settlement, might they at least require clients to pay reasonable fees for services
after a certain point in a representation? Their clients cannot pay them out of
pocket for services; that is why the lawyers are providing the services for free.
But might public interest lawyers require clients to begin paying for services
under certain conditions, such as if clients want to accept a settlement that does
not provide for attorneys' fees? As I explain below, courts view agreements
about how clients will ensure lawyer payment for legal services not as going to
clients' fundamental rights to make settlement decisions but simply as
agreements about how their lawyer will be paid. Courts grant lawyers wide
deference in how they wish to structure client payment obligations, even in
cases involving statutory fee awards.
Any discussion about settlement and attorneys' fees in public interest
litigation51 must start with the Supreme Court's holding in Evans v. Jeff D.52
That case held that defendants in public interest litigation may refuse to provide
attorneys' fees in settlement offers they present to plaintiffs. Moreover, the
Court held, a public interest lawyer is ethically bound to accept such a
settlement on behalf of a client if it is in the client's best interest and the client
wants to accept it.53 A divided majority of the Court adopted this holding over
the strong dissent of liberal Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.5 4 It has
proved vexatious to public interest lawyers and arguably provides a road map
for defendants to insist that plaintiffs waive attorneys' fees in settlements.
A significant literature has addressed the problems Evans v. Jeff D causes
the public interest bar.55 Researchers have concluded that this case and others
51. Federal civil rights statutes provide for the award of attorneys' fees for litigation
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and similar statutes provide for court awards of attorneys' fees
to prevailing parties in other types of litigation aimed at enforcing public policy. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (providing for attorneys' fee awards in § 1983 litigation).
52. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
53. Id. at 739.
54. Id. at 743.
55. See, e.g., Ashley E. Compton, Shifting the Blame: The Dilemma of Fee-Shifting
Statutes and Fee-Waiver Settlements, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 761 (2009) (criticizing this
case and subsequent state bar legal ethics opinions agreeing with it); Reingold, supra note 13
(presenting a comprehensive critique of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence shrinking
the efficacy of § 1983 litigation and emphasizing Evans v. Jeff D. in this analysis); see also
Daniel Nazer, Conflict and Solidarity: The Legacy of Evans v. Jeff D., 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 499, 500 n.5 (2004) (presenting a critique of Evans v. Jeff D. and citing earlier
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deserve considerable blame for drastically shrinking the number of public
interest lawyers in practice who substantially rely on attorneys' fee awards.56
Scholars have offered a variety of proposals for reform,57 but as of yet no one
has claimed to have found a solution. Nor do I claim to do so here. Instead, I
point out a neglected aspect of the Court's jurisprudence on attorneys' fees that
may spark creative thinking about paths forward in seeking to prevent the
demise of the public interest bar.
As commentators have noted, public interest lawyers have responded to
Evans v. Jeff D. in a number of ways. Some public interest lawyers explain,
either orally or in writing, that they hope and expect that their client will
understand the importance of lawyers receiving attorneys' fees so that they may
continue to represent future clients.5 8 This approach leaves to the client's
conscience at a later time the ultimate decision as to whether to accept a
settlement proposal that does not provide for attorneys' fees. The lawyer hopes
the client will insist on reasonable attorney fees in any settlement offer she
accepts, but does not attempt to impose a binding commitment on the client to
do so. Public interest lawyers report to me that many clients do abide by such
nonbinding commitments to insist on attorneys' fees as part of any settlement
agreement they will accept. Thus, this approach is all to the good to the extent
that it works, but it leaves public interest lawyers exposed to the risk of not
being paid for services if their clients have a change of heart in the throes of
settlement negotiations.
Moreover, commentators have argued that leaving decisions to the
voluntary conscience of clients has other downsides. This approach means that
lawyers can only feel comfortable accepting clients when they are confident the
clients will refuse fee waiver settlements. In other words, this approach requires
lawyers to be cautious, and only accept representations of clients they feel they
"understand." Such clients are likely to be more demographically similar to the
lawyers than would otherwise be the case.59 This, in turn, hurts the objective of
making representation available to more people, including people with few
scholarship on this issue). Nazer's analysis relied in part on a particular ethics opinion,
which the California State Bar Association later revoked. See CA Ethics Op. 2009-176
(2009), WL 1653156 (concluding that fee waiver settlements are ethically permissible, in
contrast to its earlier view); see also Steven M. Goldstein, Settlement Offers Contingent upon
Waiver of Attorney Fee: A Continuing Dilemma After Evans v. Jeff D., 20 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 693 (1986).
56. See, e.g., Reingold, supra note 13, at 3 (concluding that "it is clear that Evans
destroyed § 1983 as a remedy for civil rights plaintiffs with only modest damages," and did
so "by driving their lawyers out of the civil rights business.")
57. See id. at 21-28 (outlining a variety of these proposals scholars have offered and
adding his own proposal that Congress pass legislation abrogating Evans v. Jeff D.).
58. See, e.g., Nazer, supra note 55, at 530-33 (discussing this option).
59. See, e.g., id.; Compton, supra note 55, at 769 (arguing that "[t]his selection
technique . . . may make it more difficult for a non-activist plaintiff to gain representation"
and that " 'client education' borders on coercion") (internal citations omitted).
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means who appear most susceptible to the temptations of a favorable settlement
containing a fee waiver provision.
A second option involves placing a provision in client retainer agreements
through which clients promise ex ante not to accept settlement offers that
contain attorney fee waivers. One can imagine a court holding that such an
agreement runs afoul of the MR 1.2(a) prohibition on restricting clients' rights
to make settlement decisions, for all the reasons discussed in Part I above.
However, as I explain in more detail below, there is a good argument that
allowing clients to pre-commit in this way respects their dignity and autonomy
rights, and philosophical work on pre-commitment supports this claim. At
bottom, neither of the two options-of either non-enforceable or purportedly
enforceable ex ante client promises-are entirely satisfactory, although they
are, to my knowledge, the ones on which public interest lawyers most often
rely.
Happily, however, other options exist as well. As I will explain below, it is
well settled that a public interest lawyer may require in a retainer agreement
that the client will pay a contingency fee to the lawyer if the lawyer does not
receive sufficient attorneys' fees after successful litigation. There is no reason
lawyers cannot use a similar provision to cover settlements as well. The
Supreme Court approved such an arrangement in the fully litigated case of
Venegas v. Mitchell,6 0 and a number of federal courts of appeals have applied
Venegas in a range of other situations, indicating that such an approach should
be relatively invulnerable to challenge. The Parts below provide in-depth
analysis. To fully explain these options, it is necessary to dig more deeply into
the Court's holdings in both Evans v. Jeff D. and Venegas, which I do in the
subparts below.
1. The Problem of Evans v. Jeff D.
Evans v. Jeff D. involved a class action lawsuit against the public officials
responsible for educating and treating children with emotional and cognitive
disabilities in the state of Idaho. The defendants eventually offered the
members of this class a settlement that provided virtually all or even more
relief than that to which they would have been entitled if they won their case.
The defendants conditioned this offer, however, on plaintiffs waiving their
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to attorneys' fees and costs. The plaintiffs' legal
services lawyer, Charles Johnson of the Idaho Legal Aid Society, decided that
his ethical obligations required him to accept this proposal on behalf of his
clients, which he did. He also, however, filed a motion for an award of
attorneys' fees to his legal aid office despite the language in the settlement
agreement waiving such fees. The district court denied his motion but the Ninth
60. 495 U.S. 82 (1990).
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Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in
the circuits.61
By a split majority, the Court decided that Johnson faced no ethical
dilemma. The Court reasoned that Johnson's professional obligation to place
his clients' interests above all else meant that he must accept the settlement
proposal, despite its failure to provide fees for the legal aid society that
employed him.62 Citing Judge Wald's concurrence in a then recently-decided
D.C. Circuit case, which had considered the same issue, the Court noted that
fee waivers "cut both ways." Such waivers not only allow defendants to settle
cases knowing the full costs of doing so, but also allow plaintiffs in weaker
cases, where defendants feel confident about going to trial, to obtain at least
some relief in situations in which they otherwise would be likely to obtain
nothing.63
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan, with Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joining, pointed out the potential deterrent effect on public interest litigation of
allowing defendants to condition settlement on waiver of rights to statutorily
granted attorneys' fees. Brennan stated that "[t]he conclusion that permitting
fee waivers will seriously impair the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to obtain
legal assistance is embarrassingly obvious."M However, Brennan suggested, in
the face of the majority's holding civil rights lawyers should simply obtain
advance agreements from their clients not to waive attorneys' fees. Such
advance agreements, Brennan pointed out, would "replicat[e] the private
market for legal services in which attorneys are not ordinarily required to
contribute to their clients' recovery." Such agreements might make it
economically feasible, as Congress had hoped in passing attorneys' fees
statutes, for civil rights lawyers to continue to pursue cases despite JeffD.6 5
Significantly, no one on the Court contested Brennan's view that a
contractual advance waiver of the right to relinquish attorneys' fees is a
perfectly proper solution to the problem JeffD. presents. Thus, Evans v. JeffD.
indirectly supports the contention that public interest lawyers may insist ex ante
that clients hold out for attorneys' fees in settlement negotiations. It is no secret
that some public interest lawyers do include such provisions in their retainer
61. Evans, 475 U.S. at 726.
62. Id. at 740. The majority noted that district courts have discretion to appraise the
reasonableness of particular class action settlement proposals on a case-by-case basis, and
that a court might choose to deny approval to a settlement proposal that included an attorney
fee waiver where the fee waiver reflected a defendant's practice of always refusing to pay
attorneys' fees or "a vindictive effort to deter attorneys from representing plaintiffs in civil
rights suits." Id. At least one court of appeals has held that a preliminary injunction was
appropriate to bar a defendant, the County of Los Angeles, from insisting on lump sum
settlements including all attorneys' fees in civil rights litigation. See Bernhardt v. Los
Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003).
63. 475 U.S. at 731-32.
64. Id. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 766.
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agreements;66 Brennan's dissent provides a basis for defending such
agreements.
Public interest attorneys should proceed with care in using such
agreements, however. They should especially ensure that the retainer
agreement does not impinge on clients' rights to decide on settlement, for all
the reasons discussed in Part I above. A magistrate judge in Gray v. Dummitt,
for example, found language to be unlawful where it barred a client asked to
waive attorney fees from settling. He reasoned that such language restricted the
client's right to make her own settlement decision based on the situation
presented at the time the settlement is offered.67 The district court reversed this
ruling, however, deciding, after questioning the client, that the attorney and
client's understanding was that the client could choose to settle if she wanted to
do so.
The principle that public interest lawyers should be treated the same as all
other lawyers further supports the position that public interest clients should be
66. See, e.g., Nazer, supra note 55, at 533 (reporting that one interviewee stated he
used this method with cooperating organizations). It is difficult to collect such data, since
lawyers are understandably loath to discuss practices of untested ethicality.
67. Gray v. Dummitt, 2007 WL 6925690, rev'd, 2009 WL 210865 (E.D.N.Y. 2009),
involved a § 1983 allegation that the plaintiff's constitutional rights had been violated in the
New York City foster care system. Several defendants sought to disqualify the plaintiff's law
firm, challenging its retainer agreement with its client on the ground that it was "unethical
and jeopardize[d] the integrity of the litigation." Id. at 1. This retainer agreement stated that
"if the defendants make a settlement offer that would require my attorneys to take less than
their full fees under the Civil Rights Law, my attorneys may reject the offer or seek the
opinion of the judge regarding the reasonableness of the fee." Id. at 2. After questioning the
plaintiff about her understanding of this retainer agreement, Judge Orenstein concluded that
it "improperly curtails Gray's exclusive right to settle her claims on terms she finds
acceptable," because "the Firm has improperly arrogated to itself the right to reject any
settlement offer" under which it would receive less than full fees, and also created a conflict
of interest "that produces an incentive for [her attorneys] to compromise their independent
professional judgment." Id. at 4. Citing the N.Y. County Law Ass'n, Op. No. 699 (1994), the
judge noted that "[r]egardless of informed consent, an attorney may not oblige her client to
get the attorney's consent before accepting a settlement agreement," and that, although
lawyers may collect on fee arrangements through charging liens, lawyers cannot protect their
interests "through the otherwise illegitimate arrogation of the client's right to accept or reject
a settlement offer." Id. at 6. The judge concluded that the entire retainer agreement hus was
unenforceable. Id. at 7. The district court, however, did not accept Magistrate Judge
Orenstein's conclusion. See Gray v. Dummitt, 2009 WL 210865 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Instead,
the court found, the testimony of the plaintiff and the lawyers indicated that the law firm
would not make settlement decisions without discussing them with their client. Thus
assuming that he client would be permitted to make decisions about settlement despite the
contrary language in the retainer agreement, the court upheld the legitimacy of the retainer
agreement and denied the defendants' motion to disqualify counsel. In a subsequent § 1983
foster care case that the same law firm handled before Magistrate Judge Orenstein, the judge
noted that the law firm was continuing to use the same retainer language he had previously
disapproved and again expressed his displeasure with it. See Denes Q. v. Caesar, 2009 WL
2877155, *5 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ("I continue to believe that the express language of the
retainer agreement is deeply troubling and impermissible, even if the attorneys who use it
would never seek to withhold a settlement offer from their client.").
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permitted to enter into advance waiver agreements just as fee-paying clients are
permitted to do. There is no legal ethics rule prohibiting this practice, and it
does not raise the same concerns as those that apply when lawyers ask clients to
bind themselves in advance to accept a lawyer's settlement decision. Instead,
the client simply agrees that any future settlement she may decide to accept will
include a provision to ensure that her lawyer gets paid.
Legal scholars and philosophers have explored the value of permitting
individuals to bind their future selves through advance waivers generally; they
argue that permitting advance commitments recognizes individuals' autonomy
and rights to dignity and respect.68 A good argument can be made that public
interest clients should likewise be granted autonomy and respect in being
permitted to make specific, concrete advance waiver decisions, provided these
decisions are uncoerced. Regardless of income level, competent and
autonomous clients should not be deprived of choice as to an option that is
clear, specific, and foreseeable-and also may increase the possibility of
obtaining legal representation. Thus, a potentially persuasive argument supports
lawyers' and clients' ability to make advance agreements in which clients agree
not to accept settlement offers that do not provide for attorneys' fees.
Such provisions could potentially face challenge, as happened in Gray v.
Dummitt, so caution may counsel approaches that do not limit clients'
settlement options in advance. Such approaches should look to ensuring that
lawyers receive payment for services even if a client chooses to accept a
settlement that does not provide for attorneys' fees. These directions emerge
more clearly in the Court's subsequent case of Venegas v. Mitchell.69
2. The Solution in Venegas v. Mitchell
In Venegas v. Mitchell,7 0 a case decided shortly after Evans v. Jeff D., the
Court provided insight into how it views the relationship between statutory fees
and contractual obligations between clients and attorneys in public interest
cases. Venegas involved a § 1983 police misconduct claim litigated by civil
rights lawyer Michael R. Mitchell. 7 1 Mitchell had entered into a contingent-fee
contract with his client Venegas. The contract provided that Mitchell would
receive a percentage of any gross recovery Venegas obtained, which would
68. See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75 LA. L. REv. 71, 80,
81 n. 35 (2014) (citing philosopher Derek Parfit).
69. 495 U.S. 82 (1990).
70. Id.
71. Mitchell would later litigate several additional post-Evans v. JeffD. challenges to
government defendants' practices of insisting on attorney fee waivers in settlement
agreements. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 211 F.3d 1274 (9th Cir. 2000)
(challenging the City and County of Los Angeles and individual officers for offering and
accepting lump-sum settlements in federal civil rights cases); Willard v. City of Los
Angeles, 803 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1986) (requesting attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act).
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then be offset by any court-awarded attorneys' fees.72 Mitchell's contingency
fee claim against his client ended up being larger than the amount the court
awarded to the client under § 1988. Mitchell filed a lawyer's lien against his
client for the remainder due under the contingency fee contract. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits as to whether
§ 1988 invalidates contingent-fee contracts that would require a prevailing civil
rights plaintiff to pay his attorney more than the statutory award the plaintiff
received.
Under these facts, a unanimous Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that
"§ 1988 does not prevent the lawyer from collecting a reasonable fee provided
for in a contingent fee contract even if it exceeds the statutory award."7 3 The
Court noted that § 1988 in no way regulates what plaintiffs may promise to pay
their attorneys, and certainly "does not on its face prevent the plaintiff from
promising an attorney a percentage of any money judgment that may be
recovered."7 4 The Court further noted that it had implicitly accepted that
"statutory awards of fees can coexist with private fee arrangements." Citing
Evans v. Jeff D., the court noted that it is the client's right to waive, settle or
negotiate attorney fee eligibility. 7 5 The Court reasoned that, if plaintiffs can
waive their claims altogether, they certainly should be able to "assign part of
their recovery to an attorney."76 Moreover, the Court stated, there was no bar in
its prior decisions or in the statutory scheme that "protects plaintiffs from
having to pay what they have contracted to pay."77 In short, the Court
concluded, while § 1988 controls what a losing defendant must pay, it says
nothing about a plaintiff s contractual payment obligations to a lawyer.
Following Venegas, many courts have upheld plaintiffs' obligations in
public interest cases to pay attorneys' fees to lawyers, separate and apart from
amounts covered under fee-shifting statutes.78 While all of these cases involve
72. The retainer agreement also prohibited Venegas from waiving rights to court-
awarded attorneys' fees, a feature the Court reported without negative comment. This may
suggest that the Court sees no problem with such a restriction, although the legality of this
feature of the retainer agreement was not under review. 495 U.S. at 84.
73. 495 U.S. at 86, citing Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 533 (9th Cir. 1989).
74. Id. at 87.
75. Id. at 88.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 89.
78. See, e.g., Gobert v. William, 232 F.3d 1099 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that
provisions in civil rights statutes that permit the award of reasonable attorneys' fees do not
bar enforcement of a 35% contingent fee agreement for any damages awarded to a client in
addition to a court-ordered attorney fee award); Quint v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 84
Fed. Appx. 101 (1st Cir. 2003) (enforcing both an attorneys' fee award and private
contingency fee agreements between an ADA plaintiff and various attorneys who
represented her through trial, appeal, remand and settlement); US v. Cooper Health System,
940 F. Supp. 2d 208, 214-15 (D. N.J. 2013) (holding in a False Claim Act case that ,"[u]nder
the reasoning in Venegas," an agreement between a lawyer and client that entitled the lawyer
to both an attorneys' fee award and a contingency fee meant that the lawyer could both
accept the attorneys' fees provided for in a settlement agreement with the defendant and
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attorneys' fees in successfully litigated judgments, there is no reason that
Venegas and subsequent court rulings following Venegas would not apply to
settlement as well. The upshot is that the Court views plaintiffs' rights to
statutory attorneys' fees and their contractual obligations to their lawyers as
two separate questions. The plaintiff may contract to pay her lawyer a fee
related to her monetary recovery. If she does, she must fulfill that promise,
regardless of whether she has collected-or waived the right to-statutory
attorneys' fees from the defendant. Similarly, the plaintiff may agree to provide
her attorney with a percentage of any monetary recovery she receives through a
settlement. Public interest lawyers who wish to ensure they receive fees when
their clients accept a monetary settlement can thus use contingency fee
arrangements.
Of course, this solution only helps lawyers when their clients receive
monetary compensation in a settlement agreement. A contingency fee
agreement would not have helped a lawyer such as Charles Johnson of'the
Idaho Legal Aid Society. That legal aid society had a policy forbidding lawyers
from asking clients to pay for any costs of litigation.79 Even more importantly,
the settlement in Jeff D. granted only injunctive relief, so there was no
monetary relief to divide between the plaintiffs and their attorney. The Venegas
line of cases does not directly help lawyers whose clients receive no monetary
recovery in settlement.
But Venegas does indirectly suggest additional ideas for lawyers with cases
that do not lead to monetary recovery. Another acceptable option given the
Court's reasoning in Venegas would have public interest lawyers contract with
clients to switch to a fee-for-services arrangement after a certain stage in a
representation. It would be ethically improper to tie such agreements to a
client's decision about accepting a settlement offer, for all the reasons
discussed in Part I above.80 It would appear reasonable, however, to contract
for a switch to a fee-for-services arrangement after a certain period of time or
certain stage of the litigation had passed. The result would be much like the
limited duration arrangement discussed in Part II.A above, except that the
lawyer and client would be agreeing to change the nature of payment for legal
services rather than to terminate the representation altogether. Like a limited
request that his client pay him under their contingency fee agreement; "nothing prevents the
attorney for the prevailing party from gaining additional fees, pursuant to contract, from his
own client.") (citations omitted). This court noted that such fee arrangements are subject to
the reasonableness tandard articulated Rule 1.5. 232 F.3d at 217 & n.4.
79. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 721 (1986).
80. See, e.g., Nehad v. Kubasey, 535 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that lawyers
may not "ratchet up the cost of representation [ ] if the client refuses an offer of
settlement."); Compton v. Kittleson, 171 P.3d 172 (Alaska 2007) (voiding a retainer
agreement that converted a contingency fee arrangement to an hourly fee if the client
decided to accept a settlement amount that did not compensate the attorney at a level at least
equivalent to his hourly rate for the time spent on the case); Philadelphia Ethics, Op. 88-16
(1988) (disapproving of an agreement that stated that a client would pay costs and expenses
in rejecting any settlement offer the lawyer regarded as fair and reasonable).
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duration representation agreement, such a contract could protect a lawyer from
resource drains caused by interminable representations. The parties' agreement
would provide for the client to assume financial obligations to the lawyer at a
specified reasonable point, such as after five years of representation. On the
Court's reasoning in Venegas, such an arrangement would be a private matter
of contract, not an ethics concern.
Some public interest legal organizations, as well as government and private
funders, disapprove of all arrangements in which a client could end up paying
for representation. These funders want to provide services to vulnerable clients
without any expectation of payment from those clients. Funders of course have
the right to establish the policies of their choice, but charging clients
something, even a small amount, for legal services in some situations might
preserve resources for other worthy cases. Thus, where permissible and
feasible, it may make sense for public interest lawyers to reexamine policies
that reject client payment for legal services in all situations. I am not arguing
that public interest lawyers must or should adopt fee arrangements that place
potential financial responsibility on clients, but merely suggesting that they
should consider them, perhaps more frequently than they do now.
In sum, another helpful strategy for public interest lawyers facing the
prospect of representing a client well past any chance of favorable results
would be to place limits on the duration of free legal services. This could
through retainer agreements with clients that provide for a fee-for-services,
contingency, or other cost-bearing provision to come into effect after a certain
time period or stage in litigation other than rejection of a settlement offer. This
agreement could be subject to possible re-negotiation by the parties at a later
date, but a lawyer should not be under an obligation to do so. Through such
arrangements, public interest lawyers could protect themselves from having to
continue representation without payment for services far past any feasible
chance of success or recovery of fees.
C. Lawyers May Use Representation Arrangements that Transfer
Funding Risks to Third-Party Payers
Corporate America has perfected the art of transferring risk to third-party
intermediaries; why should the public interest bar not do the same? A third
possible solution to the settlement problem in public interest law would transfer
the risk of litigation resource drains from public interest lawyers to third-party
funders. Legal ethics rules do not constrain third-party funders, so they would
be free to determine whether further pursuit of a case is worthwhile.
Thus, a possible third solution to the settlement problem in public interest
law would involve transferring the funding of public interest cases from public
interest law firms or legal services organizations to non-legal organization
third-party payers. These third-party payers could be public interest
organizations that are not organized as law firms. They could likewise be
membership organizations, organizations dedicated to particular political or
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ideological causes, labor unions, civic improvement associations, and the like.
These organizations can agree to pay for the representation of public interest
clients as third-party funders, as, indeed, already often occurs.
Simply put, the advantage of third-party payers is that they are not bound
to the legal ethics rules regarding settlement hat public interest lawyers are. In
other words, third-party payers can make litigation funding decisions without
regard to whether such decisions might be coercive or restrictive of the client's
right to decide about settlement.
Consider the following hypothetical: A non-legal services public interest
organization wants a public interest lawyer to represent a client in pursuing a
cause the organization champions. The lawyer agrees to do so. The
organization enters into a contract with the client agreeing to provide legal
services, but further provides that it may withdraw funding if it decides the
individual should accept a settlement offer but the individual does not wish to
do so. Is such an arrangement lawful? I believe the answer clearly is yes, for
reasons I explain below.
1. Third-Party Payer Arrangements
It is, of course, well settled that third parties may fund a client's case,
provided, as emphasized in MR 5.4(c), MR 1.7(b), and MR 1.8(f) and their
state equivalents, that lawyers do not allow their independent judgment in
representing a client to be diminished or otherwise adversely affected by the
fact of a third-party payer.8 1 The question thus arises whether third-party
funding arrangements bypass the ethics issues raised by the settlement problem
in public interest law. Legal ethics authorities indicate that the answer to this
question is yes, especially if, as this Article proposes, public interest lawyers
are treated the same under the ethics rules as all other lawyers.
State bar advisory legal ethics opinions are instructive on this question. The
New Hampshire Bar Association, for example, considered whether a lawyer
could take on litigation on behalf of an individual client, which a labor union
wanted to fund because it might establish a legal precedent of broad interest to
81. State bar ethics committee opinions can illustrate this proposition under facts
analogous to the issues being considered in this Article. The Florida State Bar Association
explained that a lawyer may not follow a third-party payer's instruction to file for summary
judgment where the lawyer has determined that such a motion would be against the client's
interests. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fla. St. Bar. Ass'n, FL Eth. Op. 97-
1, WL 461086 (1997). However, the Michigan Bar Association has opined that a lawyer may
represent a university professor being accused of sexual harassment where his defense was
to be paid for by his university employer, and where the university wanted to receive
periodic updates about the case, provided that the client gave informed consent, preferably
after consultation with an independent lawyer, and where it did not appear that the lawyer
would breach any ethics responsibilities to the client. State Bar of Michigan Standing
Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Op. No. RI-293 (June 2, 1997).
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its membership.82 The union wanted to pay the attorney to represent its
individual member in this case, but recognized that the case might end up being
resolved through a prejudgment settlement. Such a settlement would be
beneficial only to the individual member; it would not produce the final judicial
determination that would be of precedential value to the union. Accordingly,
the union wanted to condition its payment for legal services by requiring either
that the case could not be resolved without the union's prior permission or that
the member would be required to reimburse the union for the legal services it
had funded if the member decided to accept a settlement prior to judgment.83
The Bar Association concluded that both of these proposed arrangements
are ethically permissible. To reach this conclusion it reasoned by analogy to
third-party funding in the insurance context. The Bar Association first
addressed the proposal that the member reimburse the union for its legal fees if
the member decided to settle the case prior to judicial resolution. It concluded
that, as long as the union and its member reached this contractual rrangement
prior to the commencement of the lawyer's representation and the lawyer was
not a party to the contract, the matter was one of contract between the member
and the union. It thus did not implicate any legal ethics rules, provided that the
lawyer's independence of judgment in the case was not compromised.84
The New Hampshire Bar Association found "more difficult" the question
of whether the union could condition settlement on the union's prior
approval.85 It again turned to the analogous situation of insurance carriers,
where counsel for an insured may be required to render an evaluation of the
merits of a case to the insurance carrier, as well as to consult with the insurance
carrier in the course of representation of the insured.86 The Bar Association
82. N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Control of Settlement by Third Party Paying the
Lawyer's Fees, (Dec. 8, 1993), https://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/PEA12-93.pdf.
83. Id. at 1.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id.
86. A large literature discusses the ethics issues insurance defense raises, focusing
especially on questions about whether the insurance defense lawyer represents only the
insured or both the insured and the insurance carrier that is funding the defense of the
insured. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are
Special Solutions Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 261 (1997) (concluding that insured
parties are entitled to know that their attorneys are salaried employees of insurance
companies); Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentals ofLawyers' Ethics to Insurance
Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 74 (1997) (concluding that the single-client model,
under which counsel represents the insured party only, works best to avoid conflicts and
other ethics problems for lawyers); Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel
Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1583, 1606 (1994) (arguing that
insurance defense counsel may represent both the insured and the insurance company).
Analogously, for purposes of the analysis here, the public interest lawyer receiving third-
party funding must determine whether she represents only the client or the client and the
third-party funder; this question turns in large part on the understandings and agreement
between the parties. If the public interest lawyer has two clients (i.e., the litigant and the
third-party funder), she must determine, using traditional conflicts analysis, whether this
arrangement poses a conflict of interest, in which case she may not be able to proceed. See
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concluded that, if the attorney's independence of judgment was not influenced
by a desire to maintain the good will of the third-party funder (whether it be a
union or an insurance carrier), the attorney could represent the client in
litigation funded by the third party under this condition. It noted that the lawyer
should not be involved in negotiating the agreement, and that it would be best
for the individual member to seek independent legal advice from another
lawyer who was not involved in the action before entering into an agreement
where control of litigation decisions rests with a third-party funder.87
Similarly, The State Bar of Michigan Standing Committee on Professional
and Judicial Ethics concluded that it would be permissible for a university to
pay for a professor's legal representation in a case involving allegations of
sexual harassment of a student, where the university wanted to condition such
funding on the lawyer's agreement to disclose information about legal theories
and defenses and to consult with the university before any major turns in the
direction of the defense.8 8 Applying Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct
1.7(b) and 5.4(c), which parallel the ABA Model Rules in all relevant respects,
the Committee concluded that it was ethically permissible for the lawyer to
operate under this third-party funding arrangement, as long as there were no
circumstances or facts that would interfere with the lawyer's ability to exercise
independent judgment in the representation.89 The Committee also emphasized
that there must be full and knowing consent by the client, and that the lawyer
would not be able to attain such consent if he knew of factors that would
compromise his independent judgment.90 The Committee further noted that it
would be prudent for the lawyer to recommend that the client seek independent
advice on the arrangement from another disinterested lawyer.9 1
Yet another relevant scenario, which the New York State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics considered, involved a nonprofit
organization that wished to provide legal services to its beneficiaries as part of
its mission.92 The attorney in this situation was a salaried employee of the
nonprofit organization, which existed to provide financial counseling to low-
income individuals. The organization wanted this lawyer to advise clients on
certain legal matters and also to help these individuals file for bankruptcy
protection in situations in which they could not pay for such legal services.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983). In all events she must obtain the informed
consent of both clients before going further. Id. If the lawyer's only client is the litigant, then
she must proceed with full loyalty to that client, not allowing any compromise of her
independent judgment due to the presence of a third-party funder. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.4(c), 1.7(b), 1.8(f) (1983).
87. See N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., supra note 82.
88. Mich. Ethics Op. RI-293 (June 2, 1997), 1997 WL 452262.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Nonprofit Organization Offering Legal Services and Seeking Grants to Subsidize
the Legal Services Programs, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics 957 (2013), 2013
WL 589087.
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In considering this scenario, the New York Committee on Professional
Ethics first noted that, under New York law, lawyers may practice within
entities that are organized as nonprofits.93 It then concluded that the inquiring
attorney could provide legal services while being paid by the nonprofit. It
explained that the attorney should obtain consent from each client to receive
compensation from the nonprofit, and should not permit the organization to
interfere with his independent judgment in rendering legal services.94
In sum, several bar association legal ethics committees that have
considered third-party funding arrangements in the nonprofit context have
approved arrangements in which funders retain some control over the
expenditure of funds for further litigation as opposed to settlement. Such
arrangements are not at all uncommon, in fact, and their use could be expanded
to allow nonprofit organizations, rather than public interest lawyers, to assume
the risks of litigation and to take steps to mitigate those risks through their
contractual agreements with the clients the lawyer represents.
The fact that third-party funding of litigation is permissible does not, of
course, mean that any such arrangement will fly as a matter of legal ethics law.
By way of contrast, consider a different Michigan opinion, involving a scenario
in which a defendant in a lawsuit filed by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) proposed to pay the legal fees of other defendants in connection
with negotiating certain matters with the EPA. In this case, however, the
defendant offered to pay the attorney representing the other defendants only if
these clients agreed to settle.95 On these facts, the Committee concluded that
such a third-party payment arrangement would not be acceptable under the
Michigan ethics rules. The lawyer's desire for payment would limit his ability
to adequately counsel his clients not only about alternatives to settlement, but
also about the viability of the settlement proposal for each particular client.96 In
short, to be ethically acceptable, any third-party funder arrangement must be
structured so as to preserve lawyers' ability to render independent legal
judgment on behalf of the client in the representation.
2. Third-Party Funder Requests for Litigation Risk Assessments from
Public Interest Lawyers
The final legal ethics issue this Article considers in examining the basic
ethics issues raised by the settlement problem in public interest law involves
third-party funders' requests for candid case and/or settlement assessments
from public interest lawyers, whether these third-party funders be public
interest organizations, membership organizations, unions, legal services
benefits providers, alternative litigation financers, or others. In any of these
93. Id. at 1.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Mich. Ethics Op. RI-132 (1992), 1992 WL 510824.
96. Id. at 3.
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third-party payer scenarios, funders may request assessments from lawyers
about whether a settlement offer a client receives should be accepted. Can
lawyers provide such candid assessments? Do such requests violate the
lawyer's obligation of confidentiality to the client, especially as to adverse
assessments that may damage the client's interests as the client defines those
interests? These are questions that arise in all third-party funder situations,
including public interest representations.
At first blush, this question may appear difficult, especially in light of the
obligations the lawyer owes the client to vigilantly protect the client's interests
as the client defines them. On closer analysis, however, a straightforward
application of the relevant rules of professional responsibility provides an
affirmative answer, especially if public interest lawyers are held to the same
principles as all other lawyers. MR 2.3, dealing with lawyer evaluations for
third-party use, is directly on point. Rule 2.3 allows a lawyer to provide, an
evaluation to a third party regarding a matter affecting a client if, for starters,
the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with
other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client.97 Rule 2.3 further
states that if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is
likely to affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer should
not provide the evaluation "unless the client gives informed consent."98 The
question is how Rule 2.3 applies when a third party is paying the client's legal
fees and has an interest in obtaining the lawyer's evaluation in order to decide
whether to continue funding the litigation if the client decides not to accept a
settlement offer in the case.
As just noted, Rule 2.3 allows a lawyer to provide such an evaluation to a
third party, so long as the lawyer is "satisfied as a matter of professional
judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions
undertaken [on] behalf of the client."99 In situations where the lawyer
reasonably believes that providing an evaluation to a third party poses a
significant risk to the interests of the client-for example, where the lawyer's
evaluation of a settlement offer would likely undermine the third party's
continued willingness to fund the litigation but the client does not want to
accept the offer-the lawyer must obtain the client's consent "after the client
has been adequately informed concerning the important possible effects on the
client's interests."10 0 MR 2.3 further provides that any agreement to provide an
evaluation to an interested third party should not affect the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in the case. In other words, the lawyer
should not be swayed by the fact of third-party funding to alter her evaluation.
If the lawyer reasonably believes that providing an evaluation to the third party
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (1983).
98. Id. R. 2.3(b).
99. Id. R. 2.3 cmt. 3.
100. Id. R. 2.3 cmt. 5; see also In re Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion, 554 A.2d 1033,
1034 (R.I. 1989).
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will affect the lawyer's judgment, Rule 5.4(c) states that the lawyer should not
take the representation in the first place, or should withdraw from representing
the client immediately.10 1 Thus, Model Rule 2.3 does not give the lawyer
unlimited ability to engage in evaluations for third parties; rather, the client
must give informed consent and the lawyer must determine that the fact of
third-party funding will not affect her independent judgment.102 As noted
above, if the evaluation is "likely to affect the client's interest materially and
adversely," which might be the case when a lawyer provides her candid,
independent judgment assessing a settlement offer her client may not want to
accept, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent before entering
into such a representation arrangement.
Informed consent in this context is particularly important, because the
client's consent to the lawyer providing independent judgment may well affect
the client's interests adversely. For example, the client may wish to continue
litigating a case when the lawyer's judgment is that an offered settlement
proposal is a better idea. Or, the lawyer might possess damaging information
about the client's case that the client does not want the lawyer to disclose to the
third-party funder but which the lawyer believes she must disclose in order to
explain her evaluation. (Of course, the lawyer would have no duty to, and
should not, disclose client information to the third-party funder unless
necessary.) If the lawyer is to proceed in giving an evaluation of the case to the
third-party funder in such situations, the possibilities that the lawyer may be
compelled to state an opinion or disclose a fact contrary to the client's interests
must be clearly explained to the client as part of the process of obtaining
informed consent at the outset of the representation. As in all informed consent
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (1983).
102. Such an impermissible influence on a lawyer's independent judgment might occur,
for example, if the lawyer felt she was more loyal to the third-party funder's interests than
those of her client. This might occur, for example, when the third-party funder was a repeat
player on whom the lawyer relied for continued business. In such a situation, if the lawyer
knew the third-party funder favored early settlement, though the lawyer's independent
judgment was that a settlement offer was inadequate, the lawyer might face an impermissible
conflict of interest because she might feel pressured to recommend settlement despite her
independent judgment to the contrary. Here the lawyer must withdraw from the
representation or not accept it in the first place. In contrast, if the lawyer's judgment was that
a settlement offer was the best that could be expected even though her client wanted to hold
out for more, and the lawyer was not swayed by the third-party payer's interests, the lawyer
would not be barred from providing her best independent judgment to the third-party payer
that the settlement offer should be accepted, provided that her client had consented to her
doing so as a condition of her acceptance of his representation. The client would of course
prefer that her lawyer recommend against settlement despite her lawyer's best judgment to
the contrary, but the client has consented to the lawyer providing her independent, candid
assessment o the third-party funder as a condition of obtaining that party's funding. The
lawyer's decision to recommend settlement based on her independent assessment is not the
client's highest preference in the situation, but it is the choice that leads the client to be able
to bring the case. The client's choice remains supreme; the client has simply made the choice
prior to knowing what her lawyer's assessment of a particular settlement offer will be. I have
further discussed this issue through the lens of ABA MR 2.3 in Part II.C.2 below.
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situations, these risks disclosed to the client should be captured in writing so
that it is clear that the client understood and consented to them at the outset. If
the client changes her mind later, the lawyer will be cast in a conflict of interest
and most likely will have to withdraw from the client representation.
The client may also be helped by knowing what the third-party funder's
policies are on case settlement-for example, what kinds of settlement terms
will the funder regard as reasonable in the particular case? It may be useful for
these terms to be spelled out in the agreement between the third-party funder
and the client, which should be independent of the retainer between the lawyer
and client. Whether the lawyer can advise the client about the reasonableness of
the third-party funder's policies depends again on the lawyer's conflict of
interest analysis, but if the lawyer determines that she would have a conflict of
interest in rendering such advice because of her relationship with the third-
party funder, then she very well may have a deeper conflict as well that should
prevent her from taking on the representation.
Thus, conflict of interest issues require serious analysis in third-party
funder situations but are not inherently a bar. Likewise, other applicable ethics
rules do not present an inherent bar; rather, the rules contemplate and permit
lawyer evaluations for third-party use with client informed consent. MR 2.3,
and particularly Rule 2.3(b), mainly concern instances in which a lawyer may
be called upon to perform an evaluation that would result in disclosure of
confidential client information against the client's substantial interests.103
Rule 2.3(b) clarifies that, even in such cases of adverse disclosure, a
sufficiently informed client may be willing to accept the risk of adverse
disclosure because of the greater benefits to be derived from the transaction
supported by the lawyer's willingness to provide an evaluation to a third
party.104 Rule 2.3 allows the lawyer to proceed in this instance, provided the
client has given informed consent.
In this connection, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 95 provides further clarification. That section states that a lawyer can provide
to a non-client his evaluation of his client's case. As Restatement § 95(1)
explains: "(1) In furtherance of the objectives of a client in a representation, a
lawyer may provide to a non-client the results of the lawyer's investigation and
analysis of facts or the lawyer's professional evaluation or opinion on the
matter."10 5 In line with Rule 2.3, the Restatement emphasizes that "[w]hen
providing the information, evaluation, or opinion under Subsection (1) is
reasonably likely to affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the
lawyer must first obtain the client's consent[,]" and the client should be
adequately informed of important possible effects of disclosure of information
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95, rep. note cmt. d
(A.L.I. 2000).
104. Id.
105. Id.§ 95 (1).
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to the third party.10 6 In addition, the Restatement requires a lawyer to exercise
care with respect to the non-client, and not to make false statements.107 The
Restatement thus holds the same view as that expressed in MR 2.3(b). In
situations where providing an evaluation may require the lawyer to disclose
confidential client information that is contrary to the client's interests, the
lawyer must appropriately consult with the client and obtain the client's
consent before undertaking the evaluation.10 8 The lawyer must abide the
client's decision as to whether to offer the evaluation to a third party.109
A legal ethics opinion helps flesh out the lawyer's duties in such situations.
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued a legal ethics opinion concerming a
lawyer who was representing a client whose legal fees were being advanced by
an alternative litigation finance (ALF) provider.1 10 The client entered into a
contract with the ALF provider under which the provider would advance funds
to the client with pending civil claims, and the client would later pay the
provider the amount advanced plus additional financing fees. 1 1 The client was
required to repay the advance and remit contractual fees only if the client
received proceeds in the underlying case.112 Under these facts, the court stated,
Rule 2.3 would allow the lawyer to provide a case evaluation to the ALF
provider if the lawyer had determined that providing the evaluation was
compatible with the lawyer-client relationship.113 However, the court
cautioned, "there is a significant risk that disclosure of information to an ALF
provider about a client representation will constitute a waiver of attorney-client
privilege."ll 4 Therefore, the court required that the lawyer obtain the client's
informed consent before providing an evaluation to the ALF provider." 5
Another analogous case comes from an advisory opinion of the Michigan
State Bar Standing Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics. In this case,
a state agency established a program under which it appoints advocates to
represent parties in certain employment matters.116 These advocates represent
parties at administrative hearings. Under the terms of the state agency's
program, advocates who find cases assigned to them to be without merit are
required to provide a non-merit statement to the client explaining why the case
lacks merit. The program further requires the advocate to submit the non-merit
106. Id. § 95 (2).
107. Id. § 95 (3).
108. Id. § 95 cmt. d.
109. Id
110. The Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Disci-
pline, 2012 WL 6591524, at *1.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *9.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. MI Eth. Op. RI-103 (1991); 1991 WL 519856.
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statement to the state agency in order to be paid.1 17 Relying on an ABA ethics
opinion,118 the Michigan Ethics Committee concluded that lawyers acting as
advocates under the state program may, consistent with their ethical
responsibilities, submit non-merit statement to the state agency, provided that
their clients have consented to their doing so.1 19 Although the Michigan Ethics
Committee did not consider Rule 2.3 in reaching this conclusion, the analytic
thrust of its opinion remains consistent with this Rule: whether a lawyer may
provide a candid case assessment to a third-party funder depends on having
received a client's informed consent.
In short, Rule 2.3, read in conjunction with other ethics rules, allows a
lawyer to provide a case evaluation to a third party that is funding a client's
litigation, provided that the lawyer has obtained the client's informed consent if
such disclosure may adversely affect the client's interests. Public interest
lawyers who wish to avoid assuming the financial risks of representing non-
fee-paying clients past the point of reasonable settlement offers may wish to
represent such clients under third-party payer arrangements in which the third-
party payer independently contracts with the client on matters of case funding.
If the client gives the lawyer informed consent to give the third-party payer a
candid case evaluation, the lawyer may do so provided that the lawyer
reasonably believes her independent judgment is not compromised by the
existence of the third-party payer.
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed what a public interest lawyer can do when,
confronted with a client who disregards the lawyer's settlement advice. A
related set of concerns involves how lawyers can get reimbursed for the legal
services they have performed when a defendant refuses to pay attorneys' fees
as part of a settlement offer that is otherwise beneficial to the client's interests.
One way some lawyers may deal with these problems is simply to ignore
the legal ethics rules, out of sheer frustration with how the law handles these
problems. This Article has argued that this approach is both unwise and
unnecessary. The requirements of MR 1.2(a) and its state equivalents dictating
that clients control settlement decisions about their cases are not principles that
can be varied by the terms of a retainer agreement; the ABA Model Rules and
comments, the professional responsibility rules and comments of the states, and
117. Id. at *1.
118. See ABA Formal Ethics Op. 324 (1970) (stating that legal aid attorneys may
disclose certain client information to non-lawyer governing boards). This opinion has since
been refined and expanded; for a general summary of ABA opinions discussing legal aid
lawyers' disclosure of client information to non-lawyer supervisors and auditors, see Peter
Geraghty, Legal Aid Clients: What's in a Name?, YOUR ABA (April 2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2015/april-2015/legal-aid-clients---
whats-in-a-name-.html.
119. Id. at *3.
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the vast weight of other legal authorities are unequivocal on this issue. So too,
the Supreme Court does not appear likely to reverse its decision in Evans v. Jeff
D. any time soon.
However, lawyers can use other approaches to protect themselves without
violating ethics principles. They may do so by investigating the legality of
limited scope or limited duration representation arrangements in their relevant
jurisdictions, and by designing fee arrangements that impose some legal fees on
clients when a representation endures for a certain period, and/or results in the
lawyer being unable to recoup statutorily authorized attorneys' fees. They may
also explore the use of third-party funders to shift litigation risks away from the
lawyers who are under ethics constraints. Third-party flnders are free to offer
contractual terms that protect them against the risks of clients rejecting
reasonable settlement offers or deciding to accept offers that do not grant
attorneys' fees to their lawyers.
This Article has offered some general observations about applying legal
ethics strictures to public interest lawyers, noting in particular that sometimes
what is required is for public interest lawyers to be treated the same for legal
ethics purposes as lawyers in representation arrangements based on pecuniary
motives. Courts do not always do this, in part out of laudable concern for the
interests of the especially vulnerable clients whom public interest lawyers
typically represent. However, as this Article has pointed out, too much such
solicitude on the part of courts can backfire, exacerbating the severe problems
of access to justice that vulnerable clients face.
More broadly, the underlying intent of this Article has been to spark
creative yet practical discussion, in an experimental problem-solving spirit,
about the special ethics problems that confront public interest lawyers. In so
doing, it joins a nascent collective effort to supply legal ethics scholarship,
focused on the appropriate application or modification of existing rules, to
support the currently endangered public interest bar.120
120. For other examples of this growing literature, see Susan Bennett, Creating a Client
Consortium: Building Social Capital, Bridging Structural Holes, 13 CLINICAL L. REv. 67,
100, 107 (2006) (arguing that lawyers for poor clients should be allowed to experiment with
new transactional representation arrangements in the same way that lawyer for rich clients
are permitted to do); Carle & Cummings, supra note 4; Lucie Jewell, The Indie Lawyer of
the Future, SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 325, 327 (2014) (noting the ways in which traditional
ethics rules block experimentation with methods of providing low cost legal services and
arguing for reform); Carolyn Grose, "Once Upon a Time, in a Land Far, Far Away":
Lawyers and Clients Telling Stories about Ethics (and Everything Else), 20 HASTINGS
WOMEN's L.J. 163, 163 (2009) (criticizing legal ethics rules for treating clients as
abstractions and arguing that better ethics results arise out of contextually based analysis
flowing from lawyer client discussion).
40 [Vol. 29:1
SETTLEMENT IN PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
APPENDIX
State-by-State Summaries on Limited Scope Representation
The chart below offers a survey of the requirements for limited scope
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3. Arizona All types of * N/A * N/A
cases
4. Arkansas If the * Opposing * If the
representation is counsel must be representation is
reasonable under provided with provided by a
the written notice of lawyer from a
circumstances the limited scope nonprofit




121. The Chart is organized according to the American Bar Association state-by-state
summary on rules of limited scope representation, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
deliverylegal_services/resources/pro-seunbundling resource center/courtrules.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2017). I owe special thanks to Alison Hopkins and Danli Lan for its
preparation.
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objection is filed
6. Colorado All types of * N/A * A party
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identified subject without making
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15. Indiana All types of * N/A * A lawyer can
cases enter a limited
appearance n









































... signature is not
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17. Kansas In civil cases
46 [Vol. 29:1
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18. Kentucky All types of * N/A * N/A
cases
19. Louisiana All types of * A notice of * Any pleading
cases limited filed by an
appearance shall attorney making
specifically state a limited
the limitation of appearance shall
legal services by state in bold
subject matter, type of the
proceeding, date signature page





20. Maine All types of * N/A * Allows a lawyer
















21. Maryland All types of * N/A * Permit an
cases (scope and attorney to enter
limitations of a a limited
limited appearance, but
representation by requires the
an attorney be attorney submit
set forth in a a form of
writing) acknowledgeme
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22. All types of
Massachusetts cases
* N/A * Permit limited
appearance with
a filed notice of
appearance;













23. Michigan All types of * N/A * N/A
cases
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* Without leave of
court, the lawyer





















* Client must give
informed
consent - no -
express written
requirement
28. Nebraska N/A * Attorney must * Rule 501.2(c)
file "Certificate allowing an
of Completion of attorney to
Limited prepare court
Representation" filings for pro se
to withdraw litigants so long
(501.2(e)) and as the filings
provide copy to include
opposing counsel "Prepared By"
(6-1109(i)) with the name,
Copy of client's business address





* The lawyer must











































































30. New N/A * Rule 17(f) - al- * Client must give
Hampshire lows automatic informed
termination of consent - no
representation express written
when an attorney requirement but
files a "with- state provides
drawal of limited sample Consent
29. Nevada N/A
50 [Vol. 29:1




























32. New N/A * Lawyer must * Client must give
Mexico disclose scope of informed
representation to consent- no
court (16-303(E)) express written







33. New York N/A * Must give notice * Client must give
of limited scope informed
representation to consent - no
court if necessary express written
(1.2(c)) requirement
(1.2(c))
34. North N/A * N/A * Client must give
Carolina informed
consent - no
2018 ] 5 1





35. North N/A * A Certificate of * Requires
Dakota Completion of informed
Limited consent from
Appearance must client in writing























38. Oregon N/A Pro se litigant * Client must give
must file informed
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43. Tennessee N/A * Attorney required * Client must give
to file notice with informed
court of limited consent - no
representation at express written
beginning of requirement -
representation but written














































48. N/A * Attorney must * Client must give
Washington notify opposing informed
party of limited consent - no
scope express written
representation if requirement
Attorney wants to (1.2(c))
be informed of

















































50. Wisconsin N/A * Court filings * Requires
prepared by informed
attorney must consent from





* In family court,
the Lawyer must
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51. Wyoming N/A
and serving all
parties (5.6(D))
* Documents
prepared by
Attorney must
include statement
confirming that
documents
prepared by
counsel, name
and address of
attorney (1.2[7])
* Attorney can
appear in court
after filing notice
of entry of
appearance and
can withdraw
once appearance
is complete
(102(a)(1)(C) -
102(a)(2)(C))
* Requires
informed
consent from
client in writing
(1.2(c))
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